Deciding knowledge in security protocols under some e-voting theories

Mouhebeddine Berrima; Narjes Ben Rajeb; Véronique Cortier

RAIRO - Theoretical Informatics and Applications (2011)

  • Volume: 45, Issue: 3, page 269-299
  • ISSN: 0988-3754

Abstract

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In the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing security protocols. Security protocols require in particular to reason about the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are often considered in formal approaches: deducibility and indistinguishability relations. The first notion states whether an attacker can learn the value of a secret, while the latter states whether an attacker can notice some difference between protocol runs with different values of the secret. Several decision procedures have been developed so far for both notions but none of them can be applied in the context of e-voting protocols, which require dedicated cryptographic primitives. In this work, we show that both deduction and indistinguishability are decidable in polynomial time for two theories modeling the primitives of e-voting protocols.

How to cite

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Berrima, Mouhebeddine, Ben Rajeb, Narjes, and Cortier, Véronique. "Deciding knowledge in security protocols under some e-voting theories." RAIRO - Theoretical Informatics and Applications 45.3 (2011): 269-299. <http://eudml.org/doc/222090>.

@article{Berrima2011,
abstract = { In the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing security protocols. Security protocols require in particular to reason about the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are often considered in formal approaches: deducibility and indistinguishability relations. The first notion states whether an attacker can learn the value of a secret, while the latter states whether an attacker can notice some difference between protocol runs with different values of the secret. Several decision procedures have been developed so far for both notions but none of them can be applied in the context of e-voting protocols, which require dedicated cryptographic primitives. In this work, we show that both deduction and indistinguishability are decidable in polynomial time for two theories modeling the primitives of e-voting protocols. },
author = {Berrima, Mouhebeddine, Ben Rajeb, Narjes, Cortier, Véronique},
journal = {RAIRO - Theoretical Informatics and Applications},
keywords = {Security protocols; formal methods; decidability; e-voting; equational theory; deduction; static equivalence; security protocols; equational theory},
language = {eng},
month = {9},
number = {3},
pages = {269-299},
publisher = {EDP Sciences},
title = {Deciding knowledge in security protocols under some e-voting theories},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/222090},
volume = {45},
year = {2011},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Berrima, Mouhebeddine
AU - Ben Rajeb, Narjes
AU - Cortier, Véronique
TI - Deciding knowledge in security protocols under some e-voting theories
JO - RAIRO - Theoretical Informatics and Applications
DA - 2011/9//
PB - EDP Sciences
VL - 45
IS - 3
SP - 269
EP - 299
AB - In the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing security protocols. Security protocols require in particular to reason about the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are often considered in formal approaches: deducibility and indistinguishability relations. The first notion states whether an attacker can learn the value of a secret, while the latter states whether an attacker can notice some difference between protocol runs with different values of the secret. Several decision procedures have been developed so far for both notions but none of them can be applied in the context of e-voting protocols, which require dedicated cryptographic primitives. In this work, we show that both deduction and indistinguishability are decidable in polynomial time for two theories modeling the primitives of e-voting protocols.
LA - eng
KW - Security protocols; formal methods; decidability; e-voting; equational theory; deduction; static equivalence; security protocols; equational theory
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/222090
ER -

References

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