Incomplete information and risk sensitive analysis of sequential games without a predetermined order of turns

Rubén Becerril-Borja; Raúl Montes-de-Oca

Kybernetika (2021)

  • Issue: 2, page 312-331
  • ISSN: 0023-5954

Abstract

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The authors introduce risk sensitivity to a model of sequential games where players don't know beforehand which of them will make a choice at each stage of the game. It is shown that every sequential game without a predetermined order of turns with risk sensitivity has a Nash equilibrium, as well as in the case in which players have types that are chosen for them before the game starts and that are kept from the other players. There are also a couple of examples that show how the equilibria might change if the players are risk prone or risk adverse.

How to cite

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Becerril-Borja, Rubén, and Montes-de-Oca, Raúl. "Incomplete information and risk sensitive analysis of sequential games without a predetermined order of turns." Kybernetika (2021): 312-331. <http://eudml.org/doc/297775>.

@article{Becerril2021,
abstract = {The authors introduce risk sensitivity to a model of sequential games where players don't know beforehand which of them will make a choice at each stage of the game. It is shown that every sequential game without a predetermined order of turns with risk sensitivity has a Nash equilibrium, as well as in the case in which players have types that are chosen for them before the game starts and that are kept from the other players. There are also a couple of examples that show how the equilibria might change if the players are risk prone or risk adverse.},
author = {Becerril-Borja, Rubén, Montes-de-Oca, Raúl},
journal = {Kybernetika},
keywords = {incomplete information; sequential game; risk sensitive; turn selection process},
language = {eng},
number = {2},
pages = {312-331},
publisher = {Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR},
title = {Incomplete information and risk sensitive analysis of sequential games without a predetermined order of turns},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/297775},
year = {2021},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Becerril-Borja, Rubén
AU - Montes-de-Oca, Raúl
TI - Incomplete information and risk sensitive analysis of sequential games without a predetermined order of turns
JO - Kybernetika
PY - 2021
PB - Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR
IS - 2
SP - 312
EP - 331
AB - The authors introduce risk sensitivity to a model of sequential games where players don't know beforehand which of them will make a choice at each stage of the game. It is shown that every sequential game without a predetermined order of turns with risk sensitivity has a Nash equilibrium, as well as in the case in which players have types that are chosen for them before the game starts and that are kept from the other players. There are also a couple of examples that show how the equilibria might change if the players are risk prone or risk adverse.
LA - eng
KW - incomplete information; sequential game; risk sensitive; turn selection process
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/297775
ER -

References

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  12. Klompstra, M. B., , IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 45 (2000), 1397-1401. MR1780000DOI
  13. Nowak, A. S., Notes on risk-sensitive Nash equilibria., In: Advances in Dynamic Games: Applications to Economics, Finance, Optimization and Stochastic Control (A. S. Nowak and K. Szajowski, eds.), Birkhäuser, Boston 2005, pp. 95-109. MR2104370
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