Soyons charitables, mais pas trop !

Ruwen Ogien

Philosophia Scientiae (2002)

  • Volume: 6, Issue: 2, page 109-125
  • ISSN: 1281-2463

Abstract

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In this paper, I insist on two limits of the principle of charity. 1) The principle is supposed to help us solve the problem of the observational under-determination of our attributions of beliefs and desires. But it fails on that ground. The principle rules out attributions of beliefs and desires that are incompatible with the principle, but it cannot help us decide between incompatible attributions of beliefs and desires that are compatible with the principle; 2) Strong versions of the principle rule out the possibility of motivated irrationality. If one believes in the possibility of motivated irrationality, one cannot reasonably endorse strong versions of the principle of charity.

How to cite

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Ogien, Ruwen. "Soyons charitables, mais pas trop !." Philosophia Scientiae 6.2 (2002): 109-125. <http://eudml.org/doc/103671>.

@article{Ogien2002,
author = {Ogien, Ruwen},
journal = {Philosophia Scientiae},
language = {fre},
number = {2},
pages = {109-125},
publisher = {Éditions Kimé},
title = {Soyons charitables, mais pas trop !},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/103671},
volume = {6},
year = {2002},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Ogien, Ruwen
TI - Soyons charitables, mais pas trop !
JO - Philosophia Scientiae
PY - 2002
PB - Éditions Kimé
VL - 6
IS - 2
SP - 109
EP - 125
LA - fre
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/103671
ER -

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