Laws of nature, exceptions and tropes
Philosophia Scientiae (2003)
- Volume: 7, Issue: 2, page 189-219
- ISSN: 1281-2463
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topKistler, Max. "Laws of nature, exceptions and tropes." Philosophia Scientiae 7.2 (2003): 189-219. <http://eudml.org/doc/103701>.
@article{Kistler2003,
abstract = {I propose a realist theory of laws formulated in terms of tropes (or property instances) that avoids both the problems of the “best-systems-analysis” and the “inference problem” of realism of universals. I analyze the concept of an exceptional situation, characterized as a situation in which a particular object satisfies the antecedent but not the consequent of the regularity associated with a law, without thereby falsifying that law. To take this possibility into account, the properties linked by a law must be conceived as dispositional and not necessarily manifest.},
author = {Kistler, Max},
journal = {Philosophia Scientiae},
language = {eng},
number = {2},
pages = {189-219},
publisher = {Éditions Kimé},
title = {Laws of nature, exceptions and tropes},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/103701},
volume = {7},
year = {2003},
}
TY - JOUR
AU - Kistler, Max
TI - Laws of nature, exceptions and tropes
JO - Philosophia Scientiae
PY - 2003
PB - Éditions Kimé
VL - 7
IS - 2
SP - 189
EP - 219
AB - I propose a realist theory of laws formulated in terms of tropes (or property instances) that avoids both the problems of the “best-systems-analysis” and the “inference problem” of realism of universals. I analyze the concept of an exceptional situation, characterized as a situation in which a particular object satisfies the antecedent but not the consequent of the regularity associated with a law, without thereby falsifying that law. To take this possibility into account, the properties linked by a law must be conceived as dispositional and not necessarily manifest.
LA - eng
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/103701
ER -
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