Incommensurability and dynamic conceptual structures

Hanne Andersen

Philosophia Scientiae (2004)

  • Volume: 8, Issue: 1, page 153-168
  • ISSN: 1281-2463

Abstract

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One important problem concerning incommensurability is to explain how theories that are incommensurable can nevertheless compete. In this paper I shall briefly review Kuhn’s account of the difference between revolutionary and non-revolutionary conceptual developments. I shall argue that his taxonomic approach and the no-overlap principle it entails does not suffice to distinguish between revolutionary and non-revolutionary developments. I shall show that his approach builds mainly on analyses of feature correlations, and that it is necessary to include explanations of these feature correlations as well. This puts emphasis on theories; an element which has played only a humble role in Kuhn’s work on scientific lexicons from the 1980s and early 1990s. I shall argue that on the basis of this extended account of conceptual structures, incommensurability can be understood as overlapping feature correlations that are covered by different explanations.

How to cite

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Andersen, Hanne. "Incommensurability and dynamic conceptual structures." Philosophia Scientiae 8.1 (2004): 153-168. <http://eudml.org/doc/103711>.

@article{Andersen2004,
abstract = {One important problem concerning incommensurability is to explain how theories that are incommensurable can nevertheless compete. In this paper I shall briefly review Kuhn’s account of the difference between revolutionary and non-revolutionary conceptual developments. I shall argue that his taxonomic approach and the no-overlap principle it entails does not suffice to distinguish between revolutionary and non-revolutionary developments. I shall show that his approach builds mainly on analyses of feature correlations, and that it is necessary to include explanations of these feature correlations as well. This puts emphasis on theories; an element which has played only a humble role in Kuhn’s work on scientific lexicons from the 1980s and early 1990s. I shall argue that on the basis of this extended account of conceptual structures, incommensurability can be understood as overlapping feature correlations that are covered by different explanations.},
author = {Andersen, Hanne},
journal = {Philosophia Scientiae},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {153-168},
publisher = {Éditions Kimé},
title = {Incommensurability and dynamic conceptual structures},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/103711},
volume = {8},
year = {2004},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Andersen, Hanne
TI - Incommensurability and dynamic conceptual structures
JO - Philosophia Scientiae
PY - 2004
PB - Éditions Kimé
VL - 8
IS - 1
SP - 153
EP - 168
AB - One important problem concerning incommensurability is to explain how theories that are incommensurable can nevertheless compete. In this paper I shall briefly review Kuhn’s account of the difference between revolutionary and non-revolutionary conceptual developments. I shall argue that his taxonomic approach and the no-overlap principle it entails does not suffice to distinguish between revolutionary and non-revolutionary developments. I shall show that his approach builds mainly on analyses of feature correlations, and that it is necessary to include explanations of these feature correlations as well. This puts emphasis on theories; an element which has played only a humble role in Kuhn’s work on scientific lexicons from the 1980s and early 1990s. I shall argue that on the basis of this extended account of conceptual structures, incommensurability can be understood as overlapping feature correlations that are covered by different explanations.
LA - eng
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/103711
ER -

References

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