Semantic incommensurability and empirical comparability : the case of Lorentz and Einstein

Martin Carrier

Philosophia Scientiae (2004)

  • Volume: 8, Issue: 1, page 73-94
  • ISSN: 1281-2463

Abstract

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Semantic incommensurability is understood as non-translatability of concepts taken from different theories. My aim is to give a rational reconstruction of the notion of incommensurability underlying the writings of Feyerabend and the later Kuhn. I claim that incommensurability can be reconstructed on this basis as a coherent conception and that relevant instances can be identified. The translation failure between incommensurable concepts arises from the impossibility to jointly fulfil two conditions of adequacy that the context theory of meaning places on translations. Potential conceptual analogues either fail to preserve the conditions of application or to reproduce the relevant inferential relations. Incommensurability is thus construed as the result of a particular type of conceptual relations which is produced by the incompatibility of the pertinent theories. These conceptual relations are sufficiently tight to make an empirical comparison of the relevant theoretical assertions possible. I try to make these claims plausible by elaborating examples from classical electrodynamics and special relativity.

How to cite

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Carrier, Martin. "Semantic incommensurability and empirical comparability : the case of Lorentz and Einstein." Philosophia Scientiae 8.1 (2004): 73-94. <http://eudml.org/doc/103718>.

@article{Carrier2004,
abstract = {Semantic incommensurability is understood as non-translatability of concepts taken from different theories. My aim is to give a rational reconstruction of the notion of incommensurability underlying the writings of Feyerabend and the later Kuhn. I claim that incommensurability can be reconstructed on this basis as a coherent conception and that relevant instances can be identified. The translation failure between incommensurable concepts arises from the impossibility to jointly fulfil two conditions of adequacy that the context theory of meaning places on translations. Potential conceptual analogues either fail to preserve the conditions of application or to reproduce the relevant inferential relations. Incommensurability is thus construed as the result of a particular type of conceptual relations which is produced by the incompatibility of the pertinent theories. These conceptual relations are sufficiently tight to make an empirical comparison of the relevant theoretical assertions possible. I try to make these claims plausible by elaborating examples from classical electrodynamics and special relativity.},
author = {Carrier, Martin},
journal = {Philosophia Scientiae},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {73-94},
publisher = {Éditions Kimé},
title = {Semantic incommensurability and empirical comparability : the case of Lorentz and Einstein},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/103718},
volume = {8},
year = {2004},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Carrier, Martin
TI - Semantic incommensurability and empirical comparability : the case of Lorentz and Einstein
JO - Philosophia Scientiae
PY - 2004
PB - Éditions Kimé
VL - 8
IS - 1
SP - 73
EP - 94
AB - Semantic incommensurability is understood as non-translatability of concepts taken from different theories. My aim is to give a rational reconstruction of the notion of incommensurability underlying the writings of Feyerabend and the later Kuhn. I claim that incommensurability can be reconstructed on this basis as a coherent conception and that relevant instances can be identified. The translation failure between incommensurable concepts arises from the impossibility to jointly fulfil two conditions of adequacy that the context theory of meaning places on translations. Potential conceptual analogues either fail to preserve the conditions of application or to reproduce the relevant inferential relations. Incommensurability is thus construed as the result of a particular type of conceptual relations which is produced by the incompatibility of the pertinent theories. These conceptual relations are sufficiently tight to make an empirical comparison of the relevant theoretical assertions possible. I try to make these claims plausible by elaborating examples from classical electrodynamics and special relativity.
LA - eng
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/103718
ER -

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