Mental models, model-theoretic semantics, and the psychosemantic conception of truth

Shira Elqayam

Philosophia Scientiae (2005)

  • Volume: 9, Issue: 2, page 259-278
  • ISSN: 1281-2463

How to cite


Elqayam, Shira. "Mental models, model-theoretic semantics, and the psychosemantic conception of truth." Philosophia Scientiae 9.2 (2005): 259-278. <>.

author = {Elqayam, Shira},
journal = {Philosophia Scientiae},
language = {eng},
number = {2},
pages = {259-278},
publisher = {Éditions Kimé},
title = {Mental models, model-theoretic semantics, and the psychosemantic conception of truth},
url = {},
volume = {9},
year = {2005},

AU - Elqayam, Shira
TI - Mental models, model-theoretic semantics, and the psychosemantic conception of truth
JO - Philosophia Scientiae
PY - 2005
PB - Éditions Kimé
VL - 9
IS - 2
SP - 259
EP - 278
LA - eng
UR -
ER -


  1. [1] Barwise, Jon & Etchemendy, John1987.— The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Zbl0678.03001MR890325
  2. [2] Barwise, Jon & Moss, Lawrence1996.— Vicious Circles: On the Mathematics of Non?Wellfounded Phenomena, Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information. Zbl0865.03002MR1423600
  3. [3] Barwise, Jon & Perry, John1983.— Situations and Attitudes, Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books / MIT Press. Zbl0946.03007
  4. [4] Boden, Margaret A.1988.— Computer Models of Mind, Cambrigde, UK: Cambridge University Press. 1997 Reasoning strategies for suppositional deductions. Cognition, 62, 1–49. 
  5. [5] Byrne, Ruth M.J., Handley, Simon J., & Johnson-Laird, Philip N.1995.— Reasoning from suppositions. The quarterly journal of experimental psychology, 48A, 915–944. 
  6. [6] Cohen, L. Jonathan1981.— Can human rationality be experimentally demonstrated? Behavioral and brain sciences, 4, 317–370. 
  7. [7] Cohen, Yael1994.— Semantic Truth Theories, Jerusalem: Magness Press. Zbl0934.03003
  8. [8] Elqayam, Shira2003.— Norm, error and the structure of rationality: The case study of the knight-knave paradigm. Semiotica, 147, 265–289. In press: The meanings of paradox: Meaning preferences in multi-valued truth assignment. In Shulamith Kreitler (Ed.), The meanings of meaning, Cambridge University Press. Submitted: The collapse illusion effect: a semantic illusion of truth and paradox. 
  9. [9] Edgington, Dorothy2003.— What if? Questions about conditionals. Mind & language, 18, 380–401. MR1337606
  10. [10] Evans, Jonathan St.B.T.2002.— Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm. Psychological bulletin, 128, 978–996. 
  11. [11] Evans, Jonathan St.B.T., Handley, Simon J. & Over, David E.2003.— Conditionals and conditional probability. Journal of experimental psychology: Learning, memory and cognition, 29, 321–335. 
  12. [12] Evans, Jonathan St.B.T., Newstead, Stephen E., & Byrne, Ruth M.J.1993.— Human reasoning: The psychology of deduction, Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
  13. [13] Evans, Jonathan St.B.T., & Over, David E.1996.— Rationality and reasoning, Hove, UK: Psychology Press. In press: If. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
  14. [14] Fodor, Jerry A.1980.— Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Behavioral and brain sciences, 3, 63–110. 
  15. [15] Fraassen, Bas C., van 1966.— Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic. The Journal of Philosophy, 63, 481–495. 
  16. [16] Fraassen, Bas C., van 1969.— Presuppositions, supervaluations, and free logic. In K. Lambert (ed.), The Logical Way of Doing Things, London: Yale University Press. 1997 An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Zbl0191.29101
  17. [17] Hodges, Wilfrid2001.— Model Theory. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2001 Edition, URL = &lt;;. 
  18. [18] Johnson-Laird, Philip N.1983.— Mental models, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
  19. [19] Johnson-Laird, Philip N.2002.— Peirce, logic diagrams, and the elementary operations of reasoning. Thinking and reasoning, 8, 69–95. 
  20. [20] Johnson-Laird, Philip N. & Byrne, Ruth M.J.1990.— Meta-logical puzzles: Knights, knaves, and Rips. Cognition, 36, 69–84. 
  21. [21] Johnson-Laird, Philip N. & Byrne, Ruth M.J.1991.— Deduction. Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
  22. [22] Johnson-Laird, Philip N. & Byrne, Ruth M.J.2002.— Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological review, 109, 646–678. 
  23. [23] Johnson-Laird, Philip N., & Savary, Fabien1999.— Illusory inferences: a novel class of erroneous deductions. Cognition, 71 191–229. 
  24. [24] Johnson-Laird, Philip N., Savary, Fabien, & Bucciarelli, Monica2000.— Strategies and tactics in reasoning. In W. Schaeken, G. De-Vooght, A. Vandierendonck, and G. d’Ydewalle (Eds.), Deductive Reasoning and Strategies, Mahwa, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
  25. [25] Kleene, Stephen C.1952.— Introduction to Metamathematics, Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff. Zbl0109.00509MR51790
  26. [26] Kreitler, Hans, & Kreitler, Shulamith1976.— Cognitive Orientation and Behavior, New York: Springer. In press: The Meanings of Meaning, Cambridge University Press. 
  27. [27] Kreitler, Shulamith, & Kreitler, Hans1990.— The Cognitive Foundations of Personality Traits, New York: Plenum. 
  28. [28] Kripke, Saul1975.— Outline of a Theory of Truth. The journal of philosophy, 72, 690–716. Zbl0952.03513
  29. [29] Manktelow, Ken1999.— Reasoning and Thinking, Hove, UK: Psychology Press. 
  30. [30] Marr, David1982.— Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information, San Francisco: Freeman. 
  31. [31] Martin, Robert L. (Ed.) 1978.— The paradox of the Liar, ( 2 n d ed.). Ohio: Ridgeview. 
  32. [32] Martin, Robert L. (Ed.) 1984.— Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Zbl0623.03001
  33. [33] Montague, Richard1974.— Formal Philosophy, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
  34. [34] Over, David E. & Evans, Jonathan St.B.T.2003.— The probability of conditionals: the psychological evidence. Mind & language, 18, 340–358. 
  35. [35] Rescher, Nicholas1969.— Many-Valued Logic, New York: McGraw-Hill. Zbl0248.02023
  36. [36] Rip, Lance J.1989.— The psychology of knights and knaves. Cognition, 31, 85–116. 
  37. [37] Rip, Lance J.1994.— The Psychology of Proof. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
  38. [38] Schroyens, Walter1997.— Meta-propositional reasoning about the truth or falsity of propositions. Psychologica Belgica, 37, 219–247. 
  39. [39] Schroyens, Walter, Schaeken, Walter & d’Ydewalle, Géry1996.— Meta-propositional reasoning with knight-knave problems: The importance of being hypothesized. Psychologica Belgica, 36, 145–169. 
  40. [40] Schroyens, Walter, Schaeken, Walter & d’Ydewalle, Géry1999.— Error and bias in meta-propositional reasoning: A case of the mental model theory. Thinking and reasoning, 5, 29–65. 
  41. [41] Smullyan, Raymond M.1978.— What is the Name of this Book?, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Zbl0432.00028
  42. [42] Stalnaker, Robert1968.— A theory of conditionals. American philosophical quarterly monograph series, 2, 98–112. 
  43. [43] Tarski, Alfred1944.— The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 4, 341?375. Zbl0061.00807MR10521
  44. [44] Wason, Peter C.1960.— On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task. Quarterly journal of experimental psychology, 12, 129–140. 
  45. [45] Wason, Peter C., & Johnson-Laird, Philip N.1972.— Psychology of Reasoning: Structure and Content, London: Batsford. 

NotesEmbed ?


You must be logged in to post comments.

To embed these notes on your page include the following JavaScript code on your page where you want the notes to appear.

Only the controls for the widget will be shown in your chosen language. Notes will be shown in their authored language.

Tells the widget how many notes to show per page. You can cycle through additional notes using the next and previous controls.


Note: Best practice suggests putting the JavaScript code just before the closing </body> tag.