The objectives of science

David Miller

Philosophia Scientiae (2007)

  • Volume: 11, Issue: 1, page 21-43
  • ISSN: 1281-2463

Abstract

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Contesting the common opinion that, unlike the problem of induction, the problem of demarcation is of little significance, the paper maintains that Popper’s criterion of falsifiability gives an irresistible answer to the question of what can be learnt from an empirical investigation. Everything follows from the rejection of inductive logic, together with the recognition that, before it can be empirically investigated, a hypothesis has to be formulated and accepted. Scientific hypotheses emerge neither a posteriori, as inductivists hold, nor from some immaculate a priori source, but from sheer guesswork. Empiricists who reject apriorism have therefore enlisted too zealously in the unphilosophical ranks of epistemological naturalism. The paper concludes with a summary of Popper’s objectivism, and with brief responses to some fashionable arguments that objective truth is not an attainable objective.

How to cite

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Miller, David. "The objectives of science." Philosophia Scientiae 11.1 (2007): 21-43. <http://eudml.org/doc/103805>.

@article{Miller2007,
abstract = {Contestant l’opinion commune selon laquelle le problème de la démarcation, contrairement au problème de l’induction, est relativement anecdotique, l’article soutient que le critère poppérien de falsifiabilité donne une réponse irrésistible à la question de savoir ce qui peut être appris d’une investigation empirique. Tout découle du rejet de la logique inductive, joint à la reconnaissance du fait que, avant d’être investiguée, une hypothèse doit être formulée et acceptée. Les hypothèses scientifiques n’émergent ni a posteriori comme les inductivistes le soutiennent, ni de quelque immaculée source a priori : elles sont des conjectures pures et simples. Les empiristes qui rejettent l’apriorisme ont donc rejoint trop rapidement les rangs non philosophiques du naturalisme épistémologique. L’article conclut par un résumé de l’objectivisme popperien et par de brèves réponses à certains arguments à la mode selon lesquels la vérité objective n’est pas un objectif atteignable.},
author = {Miller, David},
journal = {Philosophia Scientiae},
language = {fre},
number = {1},
pages = {21-43},
publisher = {Éditions Kimé},
title = {The objectives of science},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/103805},
volume = {11},
year = {2007},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Miller, David
TI - The objectives of science
JO - Philosophia Scientiae
PY - 2007
PB - Éditions Kimé
VL - 11
IS - 1
SP - 21
EP - 43
AB - Contestant l’opinion commune selon laquelle le problème de la démarcation, contrairement au problème de l’induction, est relativement anecdotique, l’article soutient que le critère poppérien de falsifiabilité donne une réponse irrésistible à la question de savoir ce qui peut être appris d’une investigation empirique. Tout découle du rejet de la logique inductive, joint à la reconnaissance du fait que, avant d’être investiguée, une hypothèse doit être formulée et acceptée. Les hypothèses scientifiques n’émergent ni a posteriori comme les inductivistes le soutiennent, ni de quelque immaculée source a priori : elles sont des conjectures pures et simples. Les empiristes qui rejettent l’apriorisme ont donc rejoint trop rapidement les rangs non philosophiques du naturalisme épistémologique. L’article conclut par un résumé de l’objectivisme popperien et par de brèves réponses à certains arguments à la mode selon lesquels la vérité objective n’est pas un objectif atteignable.
LA - fre
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/103805
ER -

References

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