On a new solution concept for bargaining problems
Applicationes Mathematicae (1998)
- Volume: 25, Issue: 3, page 285-294
- ISSN: 1233-7234
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topRadzik, Tadeusz. "On a new solution concept for bargaining problems." Applicationes Mathematicae 25.3 (1998): 285-294. <http://eudml.org/doc/219203>.
@article{Radzik1998,
abstract = {The purpose of this paper is to discuss the properties of a new solution of the 2-person bargaining problem as formulated by Nash, the so-called Average Pay-off solution. This solution of a very simple form has a natural interpretation based on the center of gravity of the feasible set, and it is "more sensitive" to changes of feasible sets than any other standard bargaining solution. It satisfies the standard axioms: Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, Continuity and Twisting. Moreover, it satisfies a new desirable axiom, Equal Area Twisting. It is surprising that no standard solution of bargaining problems has this property. The solution considered can be generalized in a very natural and unique way to n-person bargaining problems.},
author = {Radzik, Tadeusz},
journal = {Applicationes Mathematicae},
keywords = {twisting; bargaining solution; bargaining problem; average pay-off solution},
language = {eng},
number = {3},
pages = {285-294},
title = {On a new solution concept for bargaining problems},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/219203},
volume = {25},
year = {1998},
}
TY - JOUR
AU - Radzik, Tadeusz
TI - On a new solution concept for bargaining problems
JO - Applicationes Mathematicae
PY - 1998
VL - 25
IS - 3
SP - 285
EP - 294
AB - The purpose of this paper is to discuss the properties of a new solution of the 2-person bargaining problem as formulated by Nash, the so-called Average Pay-off solution. This solution of a very simple form has a natural interpretation based on the center of gravity of the feasible set, and it is "more sensitive" to changes of feasible sets than any other standard bargaining solution. It satisfies the standard axioms: Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, Continuity and Twisting. Moreover, it satisfies a new desirable axiom, Equal Area Twisting. It is surprising that no standard solution of bargaining problems has this property. The solution considered can be generalized in a very natural and unique way to n-person bargaining problems.
LA - eng
KW - twisting; bargaining solution; bargaining problem; average pay-off solution
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/219203
ER -
References
top- N. Ambarci (1995), Reference functions and balanced concessions in bargaining, Canad. J. Econom. 28, 675-682.
- E. Kalai and M. Smorodinsky (1975), Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problems, Econometrica 43, 513-518. Zbl0308.90053
- J. F. Nash (1950), The bargaining problem, ibid. 28, 155-162. Zbl1202.91122
- W. Thomson (1995), Cooperative models of bargaining, in: R. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. II, North-Holland, 1237-1284. Zbl0925.90084
- W. Thomson and R. B. Myerson (1980), Monotonicity and independence axioms, Internat. J. Game Theory 9, 37-49. Zbl0428.90091
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