Different approaches to weighted voting systems based on preferential positions

Robert Bystrický

Kybernetika (2012)

  • Volume: 48, Issue: 3, page 536-549
  • ISSN: 0023-5954

Abstract

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Voting systems produce an aggregated result of the individual preferences of the voters. In many cases the aggregated collective preference – the result of the voting procedure – mirrors much more than anything else the characteristics of the voting systems. Preferential voting systems work most of the time with equidistant differences between the adjacent preferences of an individual voter. They produce, as voting systems usually do, some paradoxical results under special circumstances. However, the distances between the preferences can be understood as the function of the position in the sequence of preferences and can be aggregated in different ways fulfilling the basic attributes of the voting system. This approach at least allows us to avoid the worst paradoxical situations or to design a voting system containing some special needs.

How to cite

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Bystrický, Robert. "Different approaches to weighted voting systems based on preferential positions." Kybernetika 48.3 (2012): 536-549. <http://eudml.org/doc/246134>.

@article{Bystrický2012,
abstract = {Voting systems produce an aggregated result of the individual preferences of the voters. In many cases the aggregated collective preference – the result of the voting procedure – mirrors much more than anything else the characteristics of the voting systems. Preferential voting systems work most of the time with equidistant differences between the adjacent preferences of an individual voter. They produce, as voting systems usually do, some paradoxical results under special circumstances. However, the distances between the preferences can be understood as the function of the position in the sequence of preferences and can be aggregated in different ways fulfilling the basic attributes of the voting system. This approach at least allows us to avoid the worst paradoxical situations or to design a voting system containing some special needs.},
author = {Bystrický, Robert},
journal = {Kybernetika},
keywords = {voting system; preference; position; voting system; preference; position},
language = {eng},
number = {3},
pages = {536-549},
publisher = {Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR},
title = {Different approaches to weighted voting systems based on preferential positions},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/246134},
volume = {48},
year = {2012},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Bystrický, Robert
TI - Different approaches to weighted voting systems based on preferential positions
JO - Kybernetika
PY - 2012
PB - Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR
VL - 48
IS - 3
SP - 536
EP - 549
AB - Voting systems produce an aggregated result of the individual preferences of the voters. In many cases the aggregated collective preference – the result of the voting procedure – mirrors much more than anything else the characteristics of the voting systems. Preferential voting systems work most of the time with equidistant differences between the adjacent preferences of an individual voter. They produce, as voting systems usually do, some paradoxical results under special circumstances. However, the distances between the preferences can be understood as the function of the position in the sequence of preferences and can be aggregated in different ways fulfilling the basic attributes of the voting system. This approach at least allows us to avoid the worst paradoxical situations or to design a voting system containing some special needs.
LA - eng
KW - voting system; preference; position; voting system; preference; position
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/246134
ER -

References

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