Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games

Sylvain Sorin; Cheng Wan

RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle (2013)

  • Volume: 47, Issue: 1, page 47-58
  • ISSN: 0399-0559

Abstract

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This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game is associated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finite integer weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts and assigning each part to one subset of finitely many facilities. In the associated delegation game, a player divides her weight into several integer parts, commits each part to an independent delegate and collects the sum of their payoffs in the basic game played by these delegates. Delegation equilibrium payoffs, consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs and consistent chains inducing these ones in a delegation game are defined. Several examples are provided.

How to cite

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Sorin, Sylvain, and Wan, Cheng. "Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games." RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle 47.1 (2013): 47-58. <http://eudml.org/doc/275022>.

@article{Sorin2013,
abstract = {This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game is associated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finite integer weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts and assigning each part to one subset of finitely many facilities. In the associated delegation game, a player divides her weight into several integer parts, commits each part to an independent delegate and collects the sum of their payoffs in the basic game played by these delegates. Delegation equilibrium payoffs, consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs and consistent chains inducing these ones in a delegation game are defined. Several examples are provided.},
author = {Sorin, Sylvain, Wan, Cheng},
journal = {RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle},
keywords = {basic integer-splitting game; delegation game; delegation equilibrium payoffs; consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs; consistent chains},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {47-58},
publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
title = {Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/275022},
volume = {47},
year = {2013},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Sorin, Sylvain
AU - Wan, Cheng
TI - Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games
JO - RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle
PY - 2013
PB - EDP-Sciences
VL - 47
IS - 1
SP - 47
EP - 58
AB - This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game is associated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finite integer weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts and assigning each part to one subset of finitely many facilities. In the associated delegation game, a player divides her weight into several integer parts, commits each part to an independent delegate and collects the sum of their payoffs in the basic game played by these delegates. Delegation equilibrium payoffs, consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs and consistent chains inducing these ones in a delegation game are defined. Several examples are provided.
LA - eng
KW - basic integer-splitting game; delegation game; delegation equilibrium payoffs; consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs; consistent chains
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/275022
ER -

References

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