A note on robust Nash equilibria with uncertainties

Vianney Perchet

RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle (2014)

  • Volume: 48, Issue: 3, page 365-371
  • ISSN: 0399-0559

Abstract

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In this short note, we investigate the framework where agents or players have some uncertainties upon their payoffs or losses, the behavior (or the type, number or any other characteristics) of other players. More specifically, we introduce an extension of the concept of Nash equilibria that generalize different solution concepts called by their authors, and depending on the context, either as robust, ambiguous, partially specified or with uncertainty aversion. We provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees its existence and we show that it is actually a selection of conjectural (or self-confirming) equilibria. We finally conclude by how this concept can and should be defined in games with partial monitoring in order to preserve existence properties.

How to cite

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Perchet, Vianney. "A note on robust Nash equilibria with uncertainties." RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle 48.3 (2014): 365-371. <http://eudml.org/doc/275080>.

@article{Perchet2014,
abstract = {In this short note, we investigate the framework where agents or players have some uncertainties upon their payoffs or losses, the behavior (or the type, number or any other characteristics) of other players. More specifically, we introduce an extension of the concept of Nash equilibria that generalize different solution concepts called by their authors, and depending on the context, either as robust, ambiguous, partially specified or with uncertainty aversion. We provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees its existence and we show that it is actually a selection of conjectural (or self-confirming) equilibria. We finally conclude by how this concept can and should be defined in games with partial monitoring in order to preserve existence properties.},
author = {Perchet, Vianney},
journal = {RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle},
keywords = {robust games; robust Nash equilibria; uncertainties; partial monitoring; conjectural equilibria},
language = {eng},
number = {3},
pages = {365-371},
publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
title = {A note on robust Nash equilibria with uncertainties},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/275080},
volume = {48},
year = {2014},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Perchet, Vianney
TI - A note on robust Nash equilibria with uncertainties
JO - RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle
PY - 2014
PB - EDP-Sciences
VL - 48
IS - 3
SP - 365
EP - 371
AB - In this short note, we investigate the framework where agents or players have some uncertainties upon their payoffs or losses, the behavior (or the type, number or any other characteristics) of other players. More specifically, we introduce an extension of the concept of Nash equilibria that generalize different solution concepts called by their authors, and depending on the context, either as robust, ambiguous, partially specified or with uncertainty aversion. We provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees its existence and we show that it is actually a selection of conjectural (or self-confirming) equilibria. We finally conclude by how this concept can and should be defined in games with partial monitoring in order to preserve existence properties.
LA - eng
KW - robust games; robust Nash equilibria; uncertainties; partial monitoring; conjectural equilibria
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/275080
ER -

References

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