Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players

Sjur Didrik Flåm; Andrzej Wieczorek

Banach Center Publications (2006)

  • Volume: 71, Issue: 1, page 115-123
  • ISSN: 0137-6934

Abstract

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The paper deals with noncooperative games in which players constitute a measure space. Strategy profiles that are equal almost everywhere are assumed to have the same interactive effects. Under these circumstances we explore links between core solutions and Nash equilibria. Conditions are given which guarantee that core outcomes must be Nash equilibria and vice versa. The main contribution are results on nonemptieness of the core.

How to cite

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Sjur Didrik Flåm, and Andrzej Wieczorek. "Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players." Banach Center Publications 71.1 (2006): 115-123. <http://eudml.org/doc/281821>.

@article{SjurDidrikFlåm2006,
abstract = {The paper deals with noncooperative games in which players constitute a measure space. Strategy profiles that are equal almost everywhere are assumed to have the same interactive effects. Under these circumstances we explore links between core solutions and Nash equilibria. Conditions are given which guarantee that core outcomes must be Nash equilibria and vice versa. The main contribution are results on nonemptieness of the core.},
author = {Sjur Didrik Flåm, Andrzej Wieczorek},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {115-123},
title = {Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/281821},
volume = {71},
year = {2006},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Sjur Didrik Flåm
AU - Andrzej Wieczorek
TI - Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players
JO - Banach Center Publications
PY - 2006
VL - 71
IS - 1
SP - 115
EP - 123
AB - The paper deals with noncooperative games in which players constitute a measure space. Strategy profiles that are equal almost everywhere are assumed to have the same interactive effects. Under these circumstances we explore links between core solutions and Nash equilibria. Conditions are given which guarantee that core outcomes must be Nash equilibria and vice versa. The main contribution are results on nonemptieness of the core.
LA - eng
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/281821
ER -

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