Solidarity and cooperative bargaining solutions

Naoki Yoshihara

Banach Center Publications (2006)

  • Volume: 71, Issue: 1, page 317-330
  • ISSN: 0137-6934

Abstract

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In this paper, we consider production economies with possibly unequal production skills and with the possibility of technological innovations, in which resource allocations are determined via bargaining among individuals. We define the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining solution as the (bargaining) allocation rule whose utility outcomes just result in the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining outcomes. Two new axioms regarding compensation for low skill agents are introduced as weak versions of the solidarity condition w.r.t. change in production skills. Then, we show that the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining solution is the unique Efficient and Symmetric bargaining allocation rule satisfying both the responsibility and one of the compensation requirements.

How to cite

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Naoki Yoshihara. "Solidarity and cooperative bargaining solutions." Banach Center Publications 71.1 (2006): 317-330. <http://eudml.org/doc/281928>.

@article{NaokiYoshihara2006,
abstract = {In this paper, we consider production economies with possibly unequal production skills and with the possibility of technological innovations, in which resource allocations are determined via bargaining among individuals. We define the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining solution as the (bargaining) allocation rule whose utility outcomes just result in the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining outcomes. Two new axioms regarding compensation for low skill agents are introduced as weak versions of the solidarity condition w.r.t. change in production skills. Then, we show that the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining solution is the unique Efficient and Symmetric bargaining allocation rule satisfying both the responsibility and one of the compensation requirements.},
author = {Naoki Yoshihara},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {317-330},
title = {Solidarity and cooperative bargaining solutions},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/281928},
volume = {71},
year = {2006},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Naoki Yoshihara
TI - Solidarity and cooperative bargaining solutions
JO - Banach Center Publications
PY - 2006
VL - 71
IS - 1
SP - 317
EP - 330
AB - In this paper, we consider production economies with possibly unequal production skills and with the possibility of technological innovations, in which resource allocations are determined via bargaining among individuals. We define the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining solution as the (bargaining) allocation rule whose utility outcomes just result in the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining outcomes. Two new axioms regarding compensation for low skill agents are introduced as weak versions of the solidarity condition w.r.t. change in production skills. Then, we show that the Nash (resp. the Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining solution is the unique Efficient and Symmetric bargaining allocation rule satisfying both the responsibility and one of the compensation requirements.
LA - eng
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/281928
ER -

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