A game-theoretical model of competition for staff between two departments

A. Y. Garnaev. "A game-theoretical model of competition for staff between two departments." Banach Center Publications 71.1 (2006): 137-145. <http://eudml.org/doc/281997>.

@article{A2006,
abstract = {The main purpose of this paper is to analyze a development of a scenario suggested by Baston and Garnaev (2005) for modelling the situation where two departments in a large organization are each seeking to make an appointment within the same area of expertise, for instance, a computer science specialist. The departments are interested in three skills of the candidate (say, writing code, communication and in algorithms). In our scenario Department 1 wants to employ a candidate with excellent skills in writing code and communication. Department 2 is looking for a candidate with excellent skills in developing algorithms and communication. So, the departments have a joint interest, as well as their own interest. The scenario is modelled by a multistage non-zero sum game. Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg strategies are derived.},
author = {A. Y. Garnaev},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
keywords = {secretary problem; multistage non-zero sum game; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg strategies},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {137-145},
title = {A game-theoretical model of competition for staff between two departments},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/281997},
volume = {71},
year = {2006},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - A. Y. Garnaev
TI - A game-theoretical model of competition for staff between two departments
JO - Banach Center Publications
PY - 2006
VL - 71
IS - 1
SP - 137
EP - 145
AB - The main purpose of this paper is to analyze a development of a scenario suggested by Baston and Garnaev (2005) for modelling the situation where two departments in a large organization are each seeking to make an appointment within the same area of expertise, for instance, a computer science specialist. The departments are interested in three skills of the candidate (say, writing code, communication and in algorithms). In our scenario Department 1 wants to employ a candidate with excellent skills in writing code and communication. Department 2 is looking for a candidate with excellent skills in developing algorithms and communication. So, the departments have a joint interest, as well as their own interest. The scenario is modelled by a multistage non-zero sum game. Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg strategies are derived.
LA - eng
KW - secretary problem; multistage non-zero sum game; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg strategies
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/281997
ER -