Spreading mechanisms of cooperation for the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games

@article{GyörgySzabó2008,
abstract = {We survey several mechanisms supporting the maintenance of cooperation for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games. In these models players are located on the sites of a lattice or graph and they can follow one of the pure strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). Their total income comes from Prisoner's Dilemma games with their neighbors. We discuss the consequences of different evolutionary rules determining the time-dependence of the strategy distribution and compare the results of spreading mechanisms of cooperation.},
author = {György Szabó},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
keywords = {Prisoner's Dilemma games},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {197-215},
title = {Spreading mechanisms of cooperation for the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/282022},
volume = {80},
year = {2008},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - György Szabó
TI - Spreading mechanisms of cooperation for the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games
JO - Banach Center Publications
PY - 2008
VL - 80
IS - 1
SP - 197
EP - 215
AB - We survey several mechanisms supporting the maintenance of cooperation for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games. In these models players are located on the sites of a lattice or graph and they can follow one of the pure strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). Their total income comes from Prisoner's Dilemma games with their neighbors. We discuss the consequences of different evolutionary rules determining the time-dependence of the strategy distribution and compare the results of spreading mechanisms of cooperation.
LA - eng
KW - Prisoner's Dilemma games
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/282022
ER -