Stochastic stability in spatial games

Jacek Miękisz. "Stochastic stability in spatial games." Banach Center Publications 80.1 (2008): 245-252. <http://eudml.org/doc/282127>.

@article{JacekMiękisz2008,
abstract = {We compare two concepts of stochastic stability in spatial games. The classical approach to stochastic stability, introduced by Foster and Young [8], involves single configurations in the zero-noise limit. Ensemble stability discussed in [17] refers to ensembles of configurations in the limit of an infinite number of players. The above two limits may not commute. We will discuss reasons of such behaviour. We review some results concerning the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the long-run behaviour of stochastic dynamics of spatial games.},
author = {Jacek Miękisz},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
keywords = {evolutionary game theory; Nash equilibria; spatial games; equilibrium selection; stochastic stability},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {245-252},
title = {Stochastic stability in spatial games},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/282127},
volume = {80},
year = {2008},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Jacek Miękisz
TI - Stochastic stability in spatial games
JO - Banach Center Publications
PY - 2008
VL - 80
IS - 1
SP - 245
EP - 252
AB - We compare two concepts of stochastic stability in spatial games. The classical approach to stochastic stability, introduced by Foster and Young [8], involves single configurations in the zero-noise limit. Ensemble stability discussed in [17] refers to ensembles of configurations in the limit of an infinite number of players. The above two limits may not commute. We will discuss reasons of such behaviour. We review some results concerning the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the long-run behaviour of stochastic dynamics of spatial games.
LA - eng
KW - evolutionary game theory; Nash equilibria; spatial games; equilibrium selection; stochastic stability
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/282127
ER -