An axiomatization of the aspiration core

Hans Keiding

Banach Center Publications (2006)

  • Volume: 71, Issue: 1, page 195-204
  • ISSN: 0137-6934

Abstract

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The aspiration core of a TU game was introduced by Bennett [1] as a payoff vector which is undominated and achievable in the sense that each player belongs to a coalition which can obtain the specified payoff for its members, and which minimizes the distance to the set of aggregate feasible payoffs among all such payoff vectors. In the paper a set of axioms is proposed which characterize the aspiration core, which may be considered as an extension of the core to a much larger set of games. The axioms involve the standard notions of reduced game and converse reduced game although the notions have to be modified to allow for infeasible payoffs. Also, a class of auxiliary games which are not TU games has to be added to the domain of the abstract solution concept considered.

How to cite

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Hans Keiding. "An axiomatization of the aspiration core." Banach Center Publications 71.1 (2006): 195-204. <http://eudml.org/doc/282160>.

@article{HansKeiding2006,
abstract = {The aspiration core of a TU game was introduced by Bennett [1] as a payoff vector which is undominated and achievable in the sense that each player belongs to a coalition which can obtain the specified payoff for its members, and which minimizes the distance to the set of aggregate feasible payoffs among all such payoff vectors. In the paper a set of axioms is proposed which characterize the aspiration core, which may be considered as an extension of the core to a much larger set of games. The axioms involve the standard notions of reduced game and converse reduced game although the notions have to be modified to allow for infeasible payoffs. Also, a class of auxiliary games which are not TU games has to be added to the domain of the abstract solution concept considered.},
author = {Hans Keiding},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {195-204},
title = {An axiomatization of the aspiration core},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/282160},
volume = {71},
year = {2006},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Hans Keiding
TI - An axiomatization of the aspiration core
JO - Banach Center Publications
PY - 2006
VL - 71
IS - 1
SP - 195
EP - 204
AB - The aspiration core of a TU game was introduced by Bennett [1] as a payoff vector which is undominated and achievable in the sense that each player belongs to a coalition which can obtain the specified payoff for its members, and which minimizes the distance to the set of aggregate feasible payoffs among all such payoff vectors. In the paper a set of axioms is proposed which characterize the aspiration core, which may be considered as an extension of the core to a much larger set of games. The axioms involve the standard notions of reduced game and converse reduced game although the notions have to be modified to allow for infeasible payoffs. Also, a class of auxiliary games which are not TU games has to be added to the domain of the abstract solution concept considered.
LA - eng
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/282160
ER -

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