Discrete stochastic processes, replicator and Fokker-Planck equations of coevolutionary dynamics in finite and infinite populations
Banach Center Publications (2008)
- Volume: 80, Issue: 1, page 17-31
- ISSN: 0137-6934
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topJens Christian Claussen. "Discrete stochastic processes, replicator and Fokker-Planck equations of coevolutionary dynamics in finite and infinite populations." Banach Center Publications 80.1 (2008): 17-31. <http://eudml.org/doc/282530>.
@article{JensChristianClaussen2008,
abstract = {Finite-size fluctuations in coevolutionary dynamics arise in models of biological as well as of social and economic systems. This brief tutorial review surveys a systematic approach starting from a stochastic process discrete both in time and state. The limit N → ∞ of an infinite population can be considered explicitly, generally leading to a replicator-type equation in zero order, and to a Fokker-Planck-type equation in first order in 1/√N. Consequences and relations to some previous approaches are outlined.},
author = {Jens Christian Claussen},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
keywords = {evolutionary game theory; finite populations; asymmetric conflicts},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {17-31},
title = {Discrete stochastic processes, replicator and Fokker-Planck equations of coevolutionary dynamics in finite and infinite populations},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/282530},
volume = {80},
year = {2008},
}
TY - JOUR
AU - Jens Christian Claussen
TI - Discrete stochastic processes, replicator and Fokker-Planck equations of coevolutionary dynamics in finite and infinite populations
JO - Banach Center Publications
PY - 2008
VL - 80
IS - 1
SP - 17
EP - 31
AB - Finite-size fluctuations in coevolutionary dynamics arise in models of biological as well as of social and economic systems. This brief tutorial review surveys a systematic approach starting from a stochastic process discrete both in time and state. The limit N → ∞ of an infinite population can be considered explicitly, generally leading to a replicator-type equation in zero order, and to a Fokker-Planck-type equation in first order in 1/√N. Consequences and relations to some previous approaches are outlined.
LA - eng
KW - evolutionary game theory; finite populations; asymmetric conflicts
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/282530
ER -
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