Open topics in fuzzy coalitional games with transferable utility

Milan Mareš

Banach Center Publications (2006)

  • Volume: 71, Issue: 1, page 213-225
  • ISSN: 0137-6934

Abstract

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Vagueness is one of the phenomena which cannot be separated from the real bargaining and cooperative situations. The aim of this paper is to offer a brief survey of the recent state-of-art of the modelling of vagueness in coalitional games with transferable utility. It may be recognized in two components of these games, namely, in vague structure of coalitions where each player may simultaneously participate in several of them, and in vague expectations of coalitional pay-offs. Both these cases are described in the paper and approaches to including them into the game model are analyzed. An attempt to unify both cases into one uniform model is discussed as well.

How to cite

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Milan Mareš. "Open topics in fuzzy coalitional games with transferable utility." Banach Center Publications 71.1 (2006): 213-225. <http://eudml.org/doc/282553>.

@article{MilanMareš2006,
abstract = {Vagueness is one of the phenomena which cannot be separated from the real bargaining and cooperative situations. The aim of this paper is to offer a brief survey of the recent state-of-art of the modelling of vagueness in coalitional games with transferable utility. It may be recognized in two components of these games, namely, in vague structure of coalitions where each player may simultaneously participate in several of them, and in vague expectations of coalitional pay-offs. Both these cases are described in the paper and approaches to including them into the game model are analyzed. An attempt to unify both cases into one uniform model is discussed as well.},
author = {Milan Mareš},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {213-225},
title = {Open topics in fuzzy coalitional games with transferable utility},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/282553},
volume = {71},
year = {2006},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Milan Mareš
TI - Open topics in fuzzy coalitional games with transferable utility
JO - Banach Center Publications
PY - 2006
VL - 71
IS - 1
SP - 213
EP - 225
AB - Vagueness is one of the phenomena which cannot be separated from the real bargaining and cooperative situations. The aim of this paper is to offer a brief survey of the recent state-of-art of the modelling of vagueness in coalitional games with transferable utility. It may be recognized in two components of these games, namely, in vague structure of coalitions where each player may simultaneously participate in several of them, and in vague expectations of coalitional pay-offs. Both these cases are described in the paper and approaches to including them into the game model are analyzed. An attempt to unify both cases into one uniform model is discussed as well.
LA - eng
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/282553
ER -

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