Manipulation by Merging and Annexation in Weighted Voting Games

Slavov, Zdravko, and Evans, Christina. "Manipulation by Merging and Annexation in Weighted Voting Games." Serdica Journal of Computing 11.1 (2017): 059-072. <http://eudml.org/doc/289512>.

@article{Slavov2017,
abstract = {The problem of manipulation in voting is fundamental and has received attention in recent research in game theory. In this paper, we consider two cases of manipulation in weighted voting games done by merging of coalitions into single players and by annexation of a part or all of the voting weights of another player viewed from two perspectives: of the effect of swings of players and of the role of the Banzhaf power index. We prove two theorems for manipulation by merging and annexation, and show several attractive properties in these two processes. ACM Computing Classification System (1998): J.4, I.2.1.},
author = {Slavov, Zdravko, Evans, Christina},
journal = {Serdica Journal of Computing},
keywords = {Weighted Voting Game; Manipulation; Swing; Merging; Annexation; Banzhaf Index},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {059-072},
publisher = {Institute of Mathematics and Informatics Bulgarian Academy of Sciences},
title = {Manipulation by Merging and Annexation in Weighted Voting Games},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/289512},
volume = {11},
year = {2017},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Slavov, Zdravko
AU - Evans, Christina
TI - Manipulation by Merging and Annexation in Weighted Voting Games
JO - Serdica Journal of Computing
PY - 2017
PB - Institute of Mathematics and Informatics Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
VL - 11
IS - 1
SP - 059
EP - 072
AB - The problem of manipulation in voting is fundamental and has received attention in recent research in game theory. In this paper, we consider two cases of manipulation in weighted voting games done by merging of coalitions into single players and by annexation of a part or all of the voting weights of another player viewed from two perspectives: of the effect of swings of players and of the role of the Banzhaf power index. We prove two theorems for manipulation by merging and annexation, and show several attractive properties in these two processes. ACM Computing Classification System (1998): J.4, I.2.1.
LA - eng
KW - Weighted Voting Game; Manipulation; Swing; Merging; Annexation; Banzhaf Index
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/289512
ER -