Riformulazioni e proprietà geometriche di alcuni indici di potere in giochi cooperativi ad n persone
Bollettino dell'Unione Matematica Italiana (2006)
- Volume: 9-A, Issue: 2, page 275-278
- ISSN: 0392-4041
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