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This paper analyzes a model of formation of connected coalitions in a cooperative game. This model is a communication situation, and the Shapley value of this graph-restricted game is the Myerson value. The potential function for cooperative games was defined by Hart and Mas-Colell, and Winter showed that the Myerson value admits a potential function. We study a recursive procedure for computing the potential of the Myerson value. In section 3, we use the Myerson value for measuring voting power in the Spanish and the Andalusian Parliaments.
Bilbao Arrese, J. M., and López Vázquez, Jorge. "El potencial de Hart y Mas-Colell para juegos restringidos por grafos.." Qüestiió 20.1 (1996): 71-86. <http://eudml.org/doc/40221>.
@article{BilbaoArrese1996, author = {Bilbao Arrese, J. M., López Vázquez, Jorge}, journal = {Qüestiió}, keywords = {Juegos cooperativos; Teoría de grafos; -person games; Shapley value; Myerson value}, language = {spa}, number = {1}, pages = {71-86}, title = {El potencial de Hart y Mas-Colell para juegos restringidos por grafos.}, url = {http://eudml.org/doc/40221}, volume = {20}, year = {1996}, }
TY - JOUR AU - Bilbao Arrese, J. M. AU - López Vázquez, Jorge TI - El potencial de Hart y Mas-Colell para juegos restringidos por grafos. JO - Qüestiió PY - 1996 VL - 20 IS - 1 SP - 71 EP - 86 LA - spa KW - Juegos cooperativos; Teoría de grafos; -person games; Shapley value; Myerson value UR - http://eudml.org/doc/40221 ER -