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In this paper we review Myerson's proper equilibrium concept and introduce a strict refinement of it; we also demonstrate the existence of at least one of our solutions in every finite non-cooperative n-person normal form game.
In this paper we study some properties concerning the equilibrium point of a bimatrix game and describe a geometric method to obtain all the equilibria of a bimatrix game when one of the players has at most three pure strategies.
En este trabajo introducimos la extensión generalizada de un jungo n-personal finito en forma normal y, en dicho contexto, damos un concepto de equilibrio y algunos refinamientos estables de él. Se indican casos particulares de notable interés.
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