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The Progressive Second Price mechanism (PSP), recently introduced by
Lazar and Semret to share an
infinitely-divisible resource among users through pricing, has been shown to verify
very interesting properties.
Indeed, the incentive compatibility
property of that scheme, and the convergence to
an efficient resource allocation where established, using the framework
of .
Therefore, that auction-based allocation and pricing scheme seems
particularly well-suited to solve congestion problems in
telecommunication...
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