Limit policies in N-sector dynamic growth games with externalities.
Fischer, Ronald D., Mirman, Leonard J. (1997)
Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences
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Fischer, Ronald D., Mirman, Leonard J. (1997)
Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences
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Zhang, Wei-Bin (2002)
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
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Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel (2008)
Control and Cybernetics
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Gerasimos T. Soldatos (2000)
The Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research
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Mikhail Krastanov, Rossen Rozenov (2009)
Open Mathematics
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A well-known result in public economics is that capital income should not be taxed in the long run. This result has been derived using necessary optimality conditions for an appropriate dynamic Stackelberg game. In this paper we consider three models of dynamic taxation in continuous time and suggest a method for calculating their feedback Nash equilibria based on a sufficient condition for optimality. We show that the optimal tax on capital income is generally different from zero. ...
Guriev, Sergei, Pospelov, Igor (1999)
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
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Gómez, Manuel A. (2010)
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
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Yabuta, Masahiro (2002)
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
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Julio Clempner (2006)
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
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In this paper we introduce a new modeling paradigm for shortest path games representation with Petri nets. Whereas previous works have restricted attention to tracking the net using Bellman's equation as a utility function, this work uses a Lyapunov-like function. In this sense, we change the traditional cost function by a trajectory-tracking function which is also an optimal cost-to-target function. This makes a significant difference in the conceptualization of the problem domain,...
Jaroslav Doležal (1976)
Kybernetika
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