A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem.

Beltrán, Fernando; Santamaría, Natalia

Displaying similar documents to “A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem.”

Financial Claims and Product Market Competition: an Explanation for Permitting Banks to Hold Equity in Firms

Shin-Heng Pao, Jyh-Horng Lin (2008)

The Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research

Similarity:

Bank valuation and its connections with the subprime mortgage crisis and basel II capital accord.

Fouche, C.H., Mukuddem-Petersen, J., Petersen, M.A., Senosi, M.C. (2008)

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Similarity:

Using Monte Carlo Methods to Evaluate Sub-Optimal Exercise Policies for American Options

Alobaidi, Ghada, Mallier, Roland (2002)

Serdica Mathematical Journal

Similarity:

∗This research, which was funded by a grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, formed part of G.A.’s Ph.D. thesis [1]. In this paper we use a Monte Carlo scheme to find the returns that an uninformed investor might expect from an American option if he followed one of several näıve exercise strategies rather than the optimal exercise strategy. We consider several such strategies that an ill-advised investor might follow. We also consider...

Subprime risk and insurance with regret.

Petersen, M.A., Mukuddem-Petersen, J., Mulaudzi, M.P., De Waal, B., Schoeman, I.M. (2010)

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Similarity:

Auctions with Untrustworthy Bidders

Braynov, Sviatoslav, Pavlov, Radoslav (2007)

Serdica Journal of Computing

Similarity:

The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on external enforcement or control mechanisms for backing up a transaction. We propose two mechanisms that make bidders directly or indirectly reveal their trustworthiness. The first mechanism is based on discriminating bidding schedules that separate trustworthy from untrustworthy bidders. The second mechanism...