The so-called Petersburg paradox
Hugo Steinhaus (1949)
Colloquium Mathematicum
Similarity:
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
The search session has expired. Please query the service again.
Hugo Steinhaus (1949)
Colloquium Mathematicum
Similarity:
Aleksandra Fostikov (2006)
Review of the National Center for Digitization
Similarity:
Jean-Michel Coulomb (1997)
ESAIM: Probability and Statistics
Similarity:
John E. Walsh, Grace J. Kelleher (1970)
RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle
Similarity:
Jaideep Roy (2006)
Control and Cybernetics
Similarity:
Drakakis, Konstantinos (2010)
Journal of Probability and Statistics
Similarity:
Spasoje Mučibabić (2006)
The Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research
Similarity:
R. G. Cassidy, C. A. Field, M. J. L. Kirby (1971)
RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle
Similarity:
Bajaj, Prem N., Mendieta, G.R. (1993)
International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences
Similarity:
Berresford, Geoffrey C., Rockett, Andrew M. (2003)
International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences
Similarity:
R.S. Simon, S. Spiez, H. Torunczyk (2008)
RACSAM
Similarity:
We survey results related to the problem of the existence of equilibria in some classes of infinitely repeated two-person games of incomplete information on one side, first considered by Aumann, Maschler and Stearns. We generalize this setting to a broader one of principal-agent problems. We also discuss topological results needed, presenting them dually (using cohomology in place of homology) and more systematically than in our earlier papers.