The so-called Petersburg paradox
Hugo Steinhaus (1949)
Colloquium Mathematicum
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Displaying similar documents to “Document 3: Jean A. Ville: game theory, duality, economic growth (1983).”
The so-called Petersburg paradox
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We survey results related to the problem of the existence of equilibria in some classes of infinitely repeated two-person games of incomplete information on one side, first considered by Aumann, Maschler and Stearns. We generalize this setting to a broader one of principal-agent problems. We also discuss topological results needed, presenting them dually (using cohomology in place of homology) and more systematically than in our earlier papers.