Displaying similar documents to “A budget of paradoxes”

Grokking Condorcet's 1785 Essai.

Urken, Arnold B. (2008)

Journal Électronique d'Histoire des Probabilités et de la Statistique [electronic only]

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Auctions with Untrustworthy Bidders

Braynov, Sviatoslav, Pavlov, Radoslav (2007)

Serdica Journal of Computing

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The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on external enforcement or control mechanisms for backing up a transaction. We propose two mechanisms that make bidders directly or indirectly reveal their trustworthiness. The first mechanism is based on discriminating bidding schedules that separate trustworthy from untrustworthy bidders. The second mechanism...

On the foundations of statistics and decision theory.

José M. Bernardo, Javier Girón (1983)

Trabajos de Estadística e Investigación Operativa

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An elementary axiomatic foundation for decision theory is presented at a general enough level to cover standard applications of Bayesian methods. The intuitive meaning of both axioms and results is stressed. It is argued that statistical inference is a particular decision problem to which the axiomatic argument fully applies.

Personal and inter-personal ethics: Discussion.

Dennis V. Lindley, Allan M. Skene, José M. Bernardo, Morris H. DeGroot, Irving John Good, Anthony O'Hagan (1980)

Trabajos de Estadística e Investigación Operativa

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Discussion on the papers by Savage, I. Richard, On not being rational and by Kadane, Joseph B. and Sedransj, Nell, Toward a more ethical clinical trial, both of them part of a round table on Personal and inter-personal ethics held in the First International Congress on Bayesian Methods (Valencia, Spain, 28 May - 2 June 1979).

Dynamic model of market with uninformed market maker

Martin Šmíd, Miloš Kopa (2017)

Kybernetika

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We model a market with multiple liquidity takers and a single market maker maximizing his discounted consumption while keeping a prescribed probability of bankruptcy. We show that, given this setting, spread and price bias (a difference between the midpoint- and the expected fair price) depend solely on the MM's inventory and his uncertainty concerning the fair price. Tested on ten-second data from ten US electronic markets, our model gives significant results with the price bias decreasing...