Subprime risk and insurance with regret.
Petersen, M.A., Mukuddem-Petersen, J., Mulaudzi, M.P., De Waal, B., Schoeman, I.M. (2010)
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
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Petersen, M.A., Mukuddem-Petersen, J., Mulaudzi, M.P., De Waal, B., Schoeman, I.M. (2010)
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
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Li-Hui Chen (2010)
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L. Ustinovichius, V. Podvezko, R. Ginevicius (2006)
Control and Cybernetics
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Egozcue, Martin, Wong, Wing-Keung (2010)
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Rong Zhang, Bin Liu, Sifeng Liu (2010)
Computer Science and Information Systems
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C. Bielza, M. Gómez, S. Ríos-Insua, P. García Barreno, M. Sánchez Luna, A. Mateos, M. Sánchez Luna, D. Blanco (1998)
Revista de la Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas Físicas y Naturales
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Ceccarelli, Giovanni (2007)
Journal Électronique d'Histoire des Probabilités et de la Statistique [electronic only]
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Liang, Jianfeng (2009)
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Václav Beran (2003)
Applications of Mathematics
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Economic and management theories are very often based in their applications on the perception of homogeneity of the application space. The purpose of this article is to query such a conviction and indicate new possible directions of discipline development. The article deals with symbiosis of process and his steering model as a process of management. It is possible that in relative near future it will be necessary to accept approaches and changes in interpretations of decision-making....
Braynov, Sviatoslav, Pavlov, Radoslav (2007)
Serdica Journal of Computing
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The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on external enforcement or control mechanisms for backing up a transaction. We propose two mechanisms that make bidders directly or indirectly reveal their trustworthiness. The first mechanism is based on discriminating bidding schedules that separate trustworthy from untrustworthy bidders. The second mechanism...
Márien, Szabolcs (2008)
Annales Mathematicae et Informaticae
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