Displaying similar documents to “A silent-noisy versus silent duel”

Optimal risk sharing as a cooperative game

Łukasz Kuciński (2011)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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The problem of choosing an optimal insurance policy for an individual has recently been better understood, particularly due to the papers by Gajek and Zagrodny. In this paper we study its multi-agent version: we assume that insureds cooperate with one another to maximize their utility function. They create coalitions by bringing their risks to the pool and purchasing a common insurance contract. The resulting outcome is divided according to a certain rule called strategy. We address...

Yet another hat game.

Paterson, Maura B., Stinson, Douglas R. (2010)

The Electronic Journal of Combinatorics [electronic only]

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Discrete bidding games.

Develin, Mike, Payne, Sam (2010)

The Electronic Journal of Combinatorics [electronic only]

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The Give and Take game: Analysis of a resource sharing game

Pedro Mariano, Luís Correia (2015)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We analyse Give and Take, a multi-stage resource sharing game to be played between two players. The payoff is dependent on the possession of an indivisible and durable resource, and in each stage players may either do nothing or, depending on their roles, give the resource or take it. Despite these simple rules, we show that this game has interesting complex dynamics. Unique to Give and Take is the existence of multiple Pareto optimal profiles that can also be Nash equilibria, and a...

Method of construction of the evasion strategy for differential games with many pursuers

Witold Rzymowski

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CONTENTSIntroduction...........................................................................51. Preliminaries.....................................................................6 1.1. Notation........................................................................6 1.2. Control systems. Strategies..........................................72. Main lemma......................................................................93. Avoidance of many pursuers..........................................14 3.1....