Displaying similar documents to “Repeated games with asymmetric information modeling financial markets with two risky assets”

Random priority two-person full-information best choice problem with imperfect observation

Zdzisław Porosiński, Krzysztof Szajowski (2000)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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The following version of the two-player best choice problem is considered. Two players observe a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with a known continuous distribution. The random variables cannot be perfectly observed. Each time a random variable is sampled, the sampler is only informed whether it is greater than or less than some level specified by him. The aim of the players is to choose the best observation in the sequence (the maximal one). Each player can accept at most one realization...

The Give and Take game: Analysis of a resource sharing game

Pedro Mariano, Luís Correia (2015)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We analyse Give and Take, a multi-stage resource sharing game to be played between two players. The payoff is dependent on the possession of an indivisible and durable resource, and in each stage players may either do nothing or, depending on their roles, give the resource or take it. Despite these simple rules, we show that this game has interesting complex dynamics. Unique to Give and Take is the existence of multiple Pareto optimal profiles that can also be Nash equilibria, and a...

Parrondo's paradox.

Berresford, Geoffrey C., Rockett, Andrew M. (2003)

International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences

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An axiomatization of the aspiration core

Hans Keiding (2006)

Banach Center Publications

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The aspiration core of a TU game was introduced by Bennett [1] as a payoff vector which is undominated and achievable in the sense that each player belongs to a coalition which can obtain the specified payoff for its members, and which minimizes the distance to the set of aggregate feasible payoffs among all such payoff vectors. In the paper a set of axioms is proposed which characterize the aspiration core, which may be considered as an extension of the core to a much larger set of...

On the hardness of game equivalence under local isomorphism

Joaquim Gabarró, Alina García, Maria Serna (2013)

RAIRO - Theoretical Informatics and Applications - Informatique Théorique et Applications

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We introduce a type of isomorphism among strategic games that we call . Local isomorphisms is a weaker version of the notions of strong and weak game isomorphism introduced in [J. Gabarro, A. Garcia and M. Serna, 412 (2011) 6675–6695]. In a local isomorphism it is required to preserve, for any player, the player’s preferences on the sets of strategy profiles that differ only in the action selected by this player. We show that the game isomorphism problem for local isomorphism is equivalent...