Displaying similar documents to “Repeated games with asymmetric information modeling financial markets with two risky assets”

Random priority two-person full-information best choice problem with imperfect observation

Zdzisław Porosiński, Krzysztof Szajowski (2000)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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The following version of the two-player best choice problem is considered. Two players observe a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with a known continuous distribution. The random variables cannot be perfectly observed. Each time a random variable is sampled, the sampler is only informed whether it is greater than or less than some level specified by him. The aim of the players is to choose the best observation in the sequence (the maximal one). Each player can accept at most one realization...

The Give and Take game: Analysis of a resource sharing game

Pedro Mariano, Luís Correia (2015)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We analyse Give and Take, a multi-stage resource sharing game to be played between two players. The payoff is dependent on the possession of an indivisible and durable resource, and in each stage players may either do nothing or, depending on their roles, give the resource or take it. Despite these simple rules, we show that this game has interesting complex dynamics. Unique to Give and Take is the existence of multiple Pareto optimal profiles that can also be Nash equilibria, and a...

Parrondo's paradox.

Berresford, Geoffrey C., Rockett, Andrew M. (2003)

International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences

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Handling a Kullback-Leibler divergence random walk for scheduling effective patrol strategies in Stackelberg security games

César U. S. Solis, Julio B. Clempner, Alexander S. Poznyak (2019)

Kybernetika

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This paper presents a new model for computing optimal randomized security policies in non-cooperative Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) for multiple players. Our framework rests upon the extraproximal method and its extension to Markov chains, within which we explicitly compute the unique Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium of the game by employing the Lagrange method and introducing the Tikhonov regularization method. We also consider a game-theory realization of the problem that involves...