Displaying similar documents to “On (anti) conditional independence in Dempster-Shafer theory.”

Foundations of subjective probability and decision making: Discussion.

Irving John Good, Ludovico Piccinato, Cesáreo Villegas, James M. Dickey, Morris H. DeGroot, Donald A. S. Fraser, Simon French, Dennis V. Lindley (1980)

Trabajos de Estadística e Investigación Operativa

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Discussion on the papers by Girón, F. J. and Ríos, S., Quasi-Bayesian behaviour: a more realistic approach to dicision making? and by Hill, B. M., On finite additivity, non-conglomerability and statistical paradoxes, both of them part of a round table on Foundations of Subjective Probability and Decision Making held in the First International Congress on Bayesian Methods (Valencia, Spain, 28 May - 2 June 1979).

Robust inference in probability under vague information.

Giuliana Regoli (1996)

Mathware and Soft Computing

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Vague information can be represented as comparison of previsions or comparison of probabilities, and a robust analysis can be done, in order to make inference about some quantity of interest and to measure the imprecision of the answers. In particular, in some decision problems the answer can be unique.

On the foundations of statistics and decision theory.

José M. Bernardo, Javier Girón (1983)

Trabajos de Estadística e Investigación Operativa

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An elementary axiomatic foundation for decision theory is presented at a general enough level to cover standard applications of Bayesian methods. The intuitive meaning of both axioms and results is stressed. It is argued that statistical inference is a particular decision problem to which the axiomatic argument fully applies.