Displaying similar documents to “Partial cooperation and convex sets.”

Convex interval games.

Gök, S.Z.Alparslan, Branzei, R., Tijs, S. (2009)

Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences

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The equal split-off set for cooperative games

Rodica Branzei, Dinko Dimitrov, Stef Tijs (2006)

Banach Center Publications

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In this paper the equal split-off set is introduced as a new solution concept for cooperative games. This solution is based on egalitarian considerations and it turns out that for superadditive games the equal split-off set is a subset of the equal division core. Moreover, the proposed solution is single valued on the class of convex games and it coincides with the Dutta-Ray constrained egalitarian solution.

Simple equilibria in finite games with convexity properties

Tadeusz Radzik, Piotr Więcek (2015)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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This review paper gives a characterization of non-coalitional zero-sum and non-zero-sum games with finite strategy spaces and payoff functions having some concavity or convexity properties. The characterization is given in terms of the existence of two-point Nash equilibria, that is, equilibria consisting of mixed strategies with spectra consisting of at most two pure strategies. The structure of such simple equilibria is discussed in various cases. In particular, many of the results...

A new geometric approach to bimatrix games.

Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, Ignacio García Jurado (1991)

Qüestiió

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In this paper we study some properties concerning the equilibrium point of a bimatrix game and describe a geometric method to obtain all the equilibria of a bimatrix game when one of the players has at most three pure strategies.

On the open-open game

Peg Daniels, Kenneth Kunen, Haoxuan Zhou (1994)

Fundamenta Mathematicae

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We modify a game due to Berner and Juhász to get what we call “the open-open game (of length ω)”: a round consists of player I choosing a nonempty open subset of a space X and II choosing a nonempty open subset of I’s choice; I wins if the union of II’s open sets is dense in X, otherwise II wins. This game is of interest for ccc spaces. It can be translated into a game on partial orders (trees and Boolean algebras, for example). We present basic results and various conditions under which...

Logical consequence and the theory of games

Paul Harrenstein (2004)

Philosophia Scientiae

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Logical notions of consequence have frequently been related to game-theoretical solution concepts. The correspondence between a formula being classically valid and the existence of a winning strategy for a player in a related two-person game, has been most prominent in this context. We propose a conservative extension of the classical notion of consequence that is based on a generalization of the game-theoretical solution concept of Nash equilibrium.