On one algorithm finding all bimatrix game equilibria
Václav Polák (1969)
Archivum Mathematicum
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Václav Polák (1969)
Archivum Mathematicum
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Srinivasan, P.S., Veeramani, P. (2004)
Fixed Point Theory and Applications [electronic only]
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Paolo Cubiotti, Giorgio Nordo (1999)
Commentationes Mathematicae Universitatis Carolinae
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We show that a recent existence result for the Nash equilibria of generalized games with strategy sets in -spaces is false. We prove that it becomes true if we assume, in addition, that the feasible set of the game (the set of all feasible multistrategies) is closed.
Beg, G.K., El-Gebeily, M.A. (2002)
International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences
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S Trybuła (1991)
Applicationes Mathematicae
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Xu, Jiuping, Yao, Liming (2010)
International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences
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Dshalalow, Jewgeni H., Treerattrakoon, Ailada (2008)
Journal of Inequalities and Applications [electronic only]
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Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo (2006)
Fixed Point Theory and Applications [electronic only]
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Michał P. Karpowicz (2012)
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
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This paper deals with the problem of designing Nash equilibrium points in noncooperative games in which agents anticipate values of Lagrange multipliers coordinating their payoff functions. The addressed model of agents' interactions, referred to as the price-anticipation game, is studied within the framework of coordination and mechanism design theory for hierarchical systems. Sufficient conditions are formulated for Nash implementation of a regular and isolated solution to a coordination...