Sur l’équilibre fort selon Berge

Moussa Larbani; Rabia Nessah

RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle (2001)

  • Volume: 35, Issue: 4, page 439-451
  • ISSN: 0399-0559

Abstract

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In this paper we study the main properties of the strong Berge equilibrium, then we prove a theorem of its existence based on the Ky Fan inequality and finally, we provide an algorithm for its determination.

How to cite

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Larbani, Moussa, and Nessah, Rabia. "Sur l’équilibre fort selon Berge." RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle 35.4 (2001): 439-451. <http://eudml.org/doc/105256>.

@article{Larbani2001,
abstract = {Dans cet article nous étudions les propriétés essentielles de l’équilibre fort selon Berge (EFSB) pour les jeux à $n$ personnes, ensuite nous prouvons son existence en utilisant l’inégalité de Ky Fan et donnons un procédé adéquat pour sa recherche pratique.},
author = {Larbani, Moussa, Nessah, Rabia},
journal = {RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle},
keywords = {jeux; équilibre; inégalité de ky Fan; non-cooperative game; Nash equilibrium; strong equilibrium},
language = {fre},
number = {4},
pages = {439-451},
publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
title = {Sur l’équilibre fort selon Berge},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/105256},
volume = {35},
year = {2001},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Larbani, Moussa
AU - Nessah, Rabia
TI - Sur l’équilibre fort selon Berge
JO - RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle
PY - 2001
PB - EDP-Sciences
VL - 35
IS - 4
SP - 439
EP - 451
AB - Dans cet article nous étudions les propriétés essentielles de l’équilibre fort selon Berge (EFSB) pour les jeux à $n$ personnes, ensuite nous prouvons son existence en utilisant l’inégalité de Ky Fan et donnons un procédé adéquat pour sa recherche pratique.
LA - fre
KW - jeux; équilibre; inégalité de ky Fan; non-cooperative game; Nash equilibrium; strong equilibrium
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/105256
ER -

References

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  1. [1] R. Aumann, Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n - Person Games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games 4. Princeton University Press (1959). Zbl0085.13005MR104521
  2. [2] C. Berge, Théorie général des jeux à n - personnes. Gauthier Villars, Paris (1957). Zbl0082.34702MR99259
  3. [3] K. Fan, Minimax Inequality and Application, in Inequality, Vol. 3, edited by O. Shisha. Academic Press, New York (1972). Zbl0302.49019MR341029
  4. [4] J.C. Harsanyi, Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points : A new proof. Int. J. Game Theory. 2 (1973) 235-250. Zbl0274.90085MR526058
  5. [5] H. Moulin, Théorie des jeux pour l’économie et la politique. Herman, Paris (1981). 
  6. [6] R.B. Myerson, Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept. Int. J. Game Theory 7 (1978) 73-80. Zbl0392.90093MR507586
  7. [7] J.F. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games. Ann. Maths 54 (1951) 286-295. Zbl0045.08202MR43432
  8. [8] G. Owen, Game Theory. Academic Press, London (1995). Zbl0544.90103MR1355082
  9. [9] R. Selten, Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Point in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Theory 4 (1975) 25-55. Zbl0312.90072MR395896
  10. [10] E. Van Damme, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg (1987). Zbl0696.90087MR917062
  11. [11] Wu Wen–Tsün and Jiang Jia–He, Essential Equilibrium Point of n -Person Non-cooperative Games. Sci. Sinica 11 (1962) 1307-1322. Zbl0141.36103

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