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A graph-theoretic characterization of the core in a homogeneous generalized assignment game

Tadeusz Sozański (2006)

Banach Center Publications

An exchange network is a socioeconomic system in which any two actors are allowed to negotiate and conclude a transaction if and only if their positions-mathematically represented by the points of a connected graph-are joined by a line of this graph. A transaction consists in a bilaterally agreed-on division of a profit pool assigned to a given line. Under the one-exchange rule, every actor is permitted to make no more than one transaction in each negotiation round. Bienenstock and Bonacich ([1])...

A new geometric approach to bimatrix games.

Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, Ignacio García Jurado (1991)


In this paper we study some properties concerning the equilibrium point of a bimatrix game and describe a geometric method to obtain all the equilibria of a bimatrix game when one of the players has at most three pure strategies.

A value based on marginal contributions for multi–alternative games with restricted coalitions

Satoshi Masuya, Masahiro Inuiguchi (2010)


This paper deals with cooperative games with n players and r alternatives which are called multi-alternative games. In the conventional multi-alternative games initiated by Bolger, each player can choose any alternative with equal possibilities. In actual social life, there exist situations in which players have some restrictions on their choice of alternatives. Considering such situations, we study restricted multi-alternative games. A value for a given game is proposed.

Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets

Andrzej Wieczorek (2004)

Applicationes Mathematicae

Large games of kind considered in the present paper (LSF-games) directly generalize the usual concept of n-matrix games; the notion is related to games with a continuum of players and anonymous games with finitely many types of players, finitely many available actions and distribution dependent payoffs; however, there is no need to introduce a distribution on the set of types. Relevant features of equilibrium distributions are studied by means of fixed point, nonlinear complementarity and constrained...

On convex combinations of two values

Andrzej Nowak, Tadeusz Radzik (1996)

Applicationes Mathematicae

We study values for cooperative TU-games which are convex combinations of the Shapley value and the solidarity value, introduced in our recent paper [1]. First, we axiomatize the convex combination of the two values in the case when the coefficients are given exogenously. Next, we give an axiomatic description of the whole family of such values.

On the complexity of the Shapley-Scarf economy with several types of goods

Katarína Cechlárová (2009)


In the Shapley-Scarf economy each agent is endowed with one unit of an indivisible good (house) and wants to exchange it for another, possibly the most preferred one among the houses in the market. In this economy, core is always nonempty and a core allocation can be found by the famous Top Trading Cycles algorithm. Recently, a modification of this economy, containing Q >= 2 types of goods (say, houses and cars for Q=2) has been introduced. We show that if the number of agents is 2, a complete...

Pareto optimality in the kidney exchange problem

Viera Borbeľová, Katarína Cechlárová (2008)


To overcome the shortage of cadaveric kidneys available for transplantation, several countries organize systematic kidney exchange programs. The kidney exchange problem can be modelled as a cooperative game between incompatible patient-donor pairs whose solutions are permutations of players representing cyclic donations. We show that the problems to decide whether a given permutation is not (weakly) Pareto optimal are NP-complete.

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