Values of majority voting games with distrust operators

Marcin Malawski

Applicationes Mathematicae (2002)

  • Volume: 29, Issue: 1, page 117-126
  • ISSN: 1233-7234

Abstract

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A distrust operator, describing a kind of agreement among a group of players, transforms any characteristic function game to another game. In this new game, a player from this group can legally access a coalition if and only if all players from the group do the same. A formula for the Shapley value of games obtained by applying distrust operators to one man-one vote majority voting games is given, and the cases in which such an "agreement" is profitable to its parties are discussed. We also prove two theorems concerning the limit behaviour of values of voting games with distrust operators when the number of players tends to infinity but the winning majority percentage remains constant.

How to cite

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Marcin Malawski. "Values of majority voting games with distrust operators." Applicationes Mathematicae 29.1 (2002): 117-126. <http://eudml.org/doc/278937>.

@article{MarcinMalawski2002,
abstract = {A distrust operator, describing a kind of agreement among a group of players, transforms any characteristic function game to another game. In this new game, a player from this group can legally access a coalition if and only if all players from the group do the same. A formula for the Shapley value of games obtained by applying distrust operators to one man-one vote majority voting games is given, and the cases in which such an "agreement" is profitable to its parties are discussed. We also prove two theorems concerning the limit behaviour of values of voting games with distrust operators when the number of players tends to infinity but the winning majority percentage remains constant.},
author = {Marcin Malawski},
journal = {Applicationes Mathematicae},
keywords = {majority voting games; Shapley value; distrust operators},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {117-126},
title = {Values of majority voting games with distrust operators},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/278937},
volume = {29},
year = {2002},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Marcin Malawski
TI - Values of majority voting games with distrust operators
JO - Applicationes Mathematicae
PY - 2002
VL - 29
IS - 1
SP - 117
EP - 126
AB - A distrust operator, describing a kind of agreement among a group of players, transforms any characteristic function game to another game. In this new game, a player from this group can legally access a coalition if and only if all players from the group do the same. A formula for the Shapley value of games obtained by applying distrust operators to one man-one vote majority voting games is given, and the cases in which such an "agreement" is profitable to its parties are discussed. We also prove two theorems concerning the limit behaviour of values of voting games with distrust operators when the number of players tends to infinity but the winning majority percentage remains constant.
LA - eng
KW - majority voting games; Shapley value; distrust operators
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/278937
ER -

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