Large games with only small players and strategy sets in Euclidean spaces

Andrzej Wieczorek. "Large games with only small players and strategy sets in Euclidean spaces." Applicationes Mathematicae 32.2 (2005): 183-193. <http://eudml.org/doc/279326>.

@article{AndrzejWieczorek2005,
abstract = {The games of type considered in the present paper (LSE-games) extend the concept of LSF-games studied by Wieczorek in [2004], both types of games being related to games with a continuum of players. LSE-games can be seen as anonymous games with finitely many types of players, their action sets included in Euclidean spaces and payoffs depending on a player's own action and finitely many integral characteristics of distributions of the players' (of all types) actions. We prove the existence of equilibria and present a minimization problem and a complementarity problem (both nonlinear) whose solutions are exactly the same as equilibria in the given game. Examples of applications include a model of social adaptation and a model of economic efficiency enforced by taxation.},
author = {Andrzej Wieczorek},
journal = {Applicationes Mathematicae},
keywords = {large game; LSE-game; equilibrium; noncooperative game; measure space of players; continuum of players; Kakutani Theorem; Cournot–Nash equilibrium; production-consumption model; competitive equilibrium; social adaptation; taxation; efficiency},
language = {eng},
number = {2},
pages = {183-193},
title = {Large games with only small players and strategy sets in Euclidean spaces},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/279326},
volume = {32},
year = {2005},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Andrzej Wieczorek
TI - Large games with only small players and strategy sets in Euclidean spaces
JO - Applicationes Mathematicae
PY - 2005
VL - 32
IS - 2
SP - 183
EP - 193
AB - The games of type considered in the present paper (LSE-games) extend the concept of LSF-games studied by Wieczorek in [2004], both types of games being related to games with a continuum of players. LSE-games can be seen as anonymous games with finitely many types of players, their action sets included in Euclidean spaces and payoffs depending on a player's own action and finitely many integral characteristics of distributions of the players' (of all types) actions. We prove the existence of equilibria and present a minimization problem and a complementarity problem (both nonlinear) whose solutions are exactly the same as equilibria in the given game. Examples of applications include a model of social adaptation and a model of economic efficiency enforced by taxation.
LA - eng
KW - large game; LSE-game; equilibrium; noncooperative game; measure space of players; continuum of players; Kakutani Theorem; Cournot–Nash equilibrium; production-consumption model; competitive equilibrium; social adaptation; taxation; efficiency
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/279326
ER -