A characterization of evolutionarily stable strategies.
The paper deals with the question of existence and properties of equilibrated distributions of individual characteristics in an infinite population. General game-theoretic methods are applied and special attention is focused on the case of fitness functions depending only on the distance of an individual characteristic from a reference point and from the mean characteristics. Iterative procedures leading to equilibrated distributions are also considered.
We consider a stochastic approach in order to define an equilibrium model for a traffic-network problem. In particular, we assume a markovian behaviour of the users in their movements throughout the zones of the traffic area. This assumption turns out to be effective at least in the context of urban traffic, where, in general, the users tend to travel by choosing the path they find more convenient and not necessarily depending on the already travelled part. The developed model is a homogeneous Markov...
We consider a stochastic approach in order to define an equilibrium model for a traffic-network problem. In particular, we assume a Markovian behaviour of the users in their movements throughout the zones of the traffic area. This assumption turns out to be effective at least in the context of urban traffic, where, in general, the users tend to travel by choosing the path they find more convenient and not necessarily depending on the already travelled part. The developed model is a homogeneous...
The paper surveys a uniform proof technique of the convexity property for three different cooperative TU games arising from three different economical settings. The production economy, common pool situation and oligopoly framework involve a cost function, but different production functions. Each of the three corresponding game theoretic models refers to some maximization problem described by optimizing a certain net profit function over all feasible production levels. The current mathematical proof...
Taking the view that infinite plays are draws, we study Conway non-terminating games and non-losing strategies. These admit a sharp coalgebraic presentation, where non-terminating games are seen as a final coalgebra and game contructors, such as disjunctive sum, as final morphisms. We have shown, in a previous paper, that Conway’s theory of terminating games can be rephrased naturally in terms of game (pre)congruences. Namely, various...
Taking the view that infinite plays are draws, we study Conway non-terminating games and non-losing strategies. These admit a sharp coalgebraic presentation, where non-terminating games are seen as a final coalgebra and game contructors, such as disjunctive sum, as final morphisms. We have shown, in a previous paper, that Conway’s theory of terminating games can be rephrased naturally in terms of game (pre)congruences. Namely, various...
We study the pricing problem between two firms when the manufacturer’s willingness to pay (wtp) for the supplier’s good is not known by the latter. We demonstrate that it is in the interest of the manufacturer to hide this information from the supplier. The precision of the information available to the supplier modifies the rent distribution. The risk of opportunistic behaviour entails a loss of efficiency in the supply chain. The model is extended to the case of a supplier submitting offers to...
In parliaments elected by proportional systems the seats are allocated to the elected political parties roughly proportionally to the shares of votes for the party lists. Assuming that members of the parliament representing the same party are voting together, it has sense to require that distribution of the influence of the parties in parliamentary decision making is proportional to the distribution of seats. There exist measures (so called voting power indices) reflecting an ability of each party...