Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets

Andrzej Wieczorek. "Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets." Applicationes Mathematicae 31.1 (2004): 79-96. <http://eudml.org/doc/279628>.

@article{AndrzejWieczorek2004,
abstract = {Large games of kind considered in the present paper (LSF-games) directly generalize the usual concept of n-matrix games; the notion is related to games with a continuum of players and anonymous games with finitely many types of players, finitely many available actions and distribution dependent payoffs; however, there is no need to introduce a distribution on the set of types. Relevant features of equilibrium distributions are studied by means of fixed point, nonlinear complementarity and constrained optimization procedures in Euclidean spaces. The games are shown to fit well the voting procedures and evolutionary processes. As an example of application, we present a model of production and consumption by infinitely many households; a competitive equilibrium is obtained via a reduction to an LSF-game; the equilibrating market mechanism is modelled by actions of infinitely many small corrective powers.},
author = {Andrzej Wieczorek},
journal = {Applicationes Mathematicae},
keywords = {-matrix game; anonymous game; Kakutani Theorem; complementarity; (Cournot-)Nash equilibrium; voting game; evolutionary models; production-consumption models; demand function; competitive equilibrium; market mechanism; invisible hand},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {79-96},
title = {Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/279628},
volume = {31},
year = {2004},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Andrzej Wieczorek
TI - Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets
JO - Applicationes Mathematicae
PY - 2004
VL - 31
IS - 1
SP - 79
EP - 96
AB - Large games of kind considered in the present paper (LSF-games) directly generalize the usual concept of n-matrix games; the notion is related to games with a continuum of players and anonymous games with finitely many types of players, finitely many available actions and distribution dependent payoffs; however, there is no need to introduce a distribution on the set of types. Relevant features of equilibrium distributions are studied by means of fixed point, nonlinear complementarity and constrained optimization procedures in Euclidean spaces. The games are shown to fit well the voting procedures and evolutionary processes. As an example of application, we present a model of production and consumption by infinitely many households; a competitive equilibrium is obtained via a reduction to an LSF-game; the equilibrating market mechanism is modelled by actions of infinitely many small corrective powers.
LA - eng
KW - -matrix game; anonymous game; Kakutani Theorem; complementarity; (Cournot-)Nash equilibrium; voting game; evolutionary models; production-consumption models; demand function; competitive equilibrium; market mechanism; invisible hand
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/279628
ER -