Coalitional stability and rationality in cooperative games
Kybernetika (1996)
- Volume: 32, Issue: 5, page 483-490
- ISSN: 0023-5954
Access Full Article
topHow to cite
topReferences
top- W. Albers, Core and kernel-variants based on imputations and demand profiles, In: Game Theory and Related Fields (O. Moeschlin and D. Pollaschke, eds.), North-Holland, Amsterdam 1979. (1979) Zbl0434.90113MR0556349
- R. J. Aumann, M. Maschler, The bargaining set for cooperative games, In: Annals of Mathematical Studies (M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley and A. W. Tucker, eds.), Princeton 1964, pp. 443-476. (1964) Zbl0132.14003MR0176842
- E. Bennett, The aspirations approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in side payments games, Internat. J. Game Theory 12 (1983), 29-35. (1983) MR0706463
- E. Bennett, W. R. Zame, Bargaining in cooperative games, Internat. J. Game Theory 17 (1988), 279-300. (1988) Zbl0661.90107MR0977404
- J. Cross, Some theoretic characteristic of economics and political coalitions, J. Conflict Resolution 11 (1967), 184-195. (1967)
- R. D. McKelvey P. C. Ordeshook, M. D. Winer, The competitive solution for N-person games without transferable utility, with an application to commitee games, The American Political Science Review 72 (1978), 599-615. (1978)
- A. Stefanescu, Competitive Solutions and Uniform Competitive Solutions for Cooperative Games, Social Science Working Paper No. 868. Institute of Technology, California 1993. (1993)
- A. Stefanescu, Solutions for transferable utility cooperative games, RAIRO Rech. Opér. 28 (1994), 369-387. (1994) MR1304249