On the structure of the core of balanced games

Stefanescu, Anton. "On the structure of the core of balanced games." Kybernetika 37.1 (2001): [39]-46. <http://eudml.org/doc/33515>.

@article{Stefanescu2001,
abstract = {The uniform competitive solutions (u.c.s.) are basically stable sets of proposals involving several coalitions which are not necessarily disjoint. In the general framework of NTU games, the uniform competitive solutions have been defined in two earlier papers of the author (Stefanescu [5]) and Stefanescu [6]). The general existence results cover most situations formalized in the framework of the cooperative game theory, including those when the coalitional function is allowed to have empty values. The present approach concerns the situation when the coalition configurations are balanced. One shows, that if the coalitional function has nonempty values, the game admits balanced u.c.s. To each u.c.s. one associated an “ideal payoff vector” representing the utilities that the coalitions promis to the players. One proves that if the game is balanced, then the core and the strong core consist of the ideal payoff vectors associated to all balanced u.c.s.},
author = {Stefanescu, Anton},
journal = {Kybernetika},
keywords = {NTU games; cooperative games; balanced games; NTU games; cooperative games; balanced games},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {[39]-46},
publisher = {Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR},
title = {On the structure of the core of balanced games},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/33515},
volume = {37},
year = {2001},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Stefanescu, Anton
TI - On the structure of the core of balanced games
JO - Kybernetika
PY - 2001
PB - Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR
VL - 37
IS - 1
SP - [39]
EP - 46
AB - The uniform competitive solutions (u.c.s.) are basically stable sets of proposals involving several coalitions which are not necessarily disjoint. In the general framework of NTU games, the uniform competitive solutions have been defined in two earlier papers of the author (Stefanescu [5]) and Stefanescu [6]). The general existence results cover most situations formalized in the framework of the cooperative game theory, including those when the coalitional function is allowed to have empty values. The present approach concerns the situation when the coalition configurations are balanced. One shows, that if the coalitional function has nonempty values, the game admits balanced u.c.s. To each u.c.s. one associated an “ideal payoff vector” representing the utilities that the coalitions promis to the players. One proves that if the game is balanced, then the core and the strong core consist of the ideal payoff vectors associated to all balanced u.c.s.
LA - eng
KW - NTU games; cooperative games; balanced games; NTU games; cooperative games; balanced games
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/33515
ER -