Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem

David M. Ramsey, and Krzysztof Szajowski. "Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem." Banach Center Publications 71.1 (2006): 253-265. <http://eudml.org/doc/281667>.

@article{DavidM2006,
abstract = {This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.},
author = {David M. Ramsey, Krzysztof Szajowski},
journal = {Banach Center Publications},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {253-265},
title = {Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/281667},
volume = {71},
year = {2006},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - David M. Ramsey
AU - Krzysztof Szajowski
TI - Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem
JO - Banach Center Publications
PY - 2006
VL - 71
IS - 1
SP - 253
EP - 265
AB - This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.
LA - eng
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/281667
ER -