Displaying similar documents to “Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem”

On infinite horizon multi-person stopping games with priorities

E. Z. Ferenstein (2006)

Banach Center Publications

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We study nonzero-sum multi-person multiple stopping games with players' priorities. The existence of Nash equilibrium is proved. Examples of multi stopping of Markov chains are considered. The game may also be presented as a special case of a stochastic game which leads to many variations of it, in which stopping is a part of players' strategies.

Equilibria in constrained concave bimatrix games

Wojciech Połowczuk, Tadeusz Radzik (2013)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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We study a generalization of bimatrix games in which not all pairs of players' pure strategies are admissible. It is shown that under some additional convexity assumptions such games have equilibria of a very simple structure, consisting of two probability distributions with at most two-element supports. Next this result is used to get a theorem about the existence of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with a possibility of payoffs equal to -∞. The first of these results is a discrete...

Some remarks on equilibria in semi-Markov games

Andrzej Nowak (2000)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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This paper is a first study of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum semi-Markov stochastic games. We consider the expected average payoff criterion under a strong ergodicity assumption on the transition structure of the games. The main result is an extension of the correlated equilibrium theorem proven for discounted (discrete-time) Markov games in our joint paper with Raghavan. We also provide an existence result for stationary Nash equilibria in the limiting average payoff semi-Markov...

Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games

Sylvain Sorin, Cheng Wan (2013)

RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle

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This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game is associated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finite integer weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts and assigning each part to one subset of finitely many facilities. In the associated delegation game, a player divides her weight into several integer parts, commits each part to an independent delegate and collects the sum of their...

Large games with only small players and finite strategy sets

Andrzej Wieczorek (2004)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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Large games of kind considered in the present paper (LSF-games) directly generalize the usual concept of n-matrix games; the notion is related to games with a continuum of players and anonymous games with finitely many types of players, finitely many available actions and distribution dependent payoffs; however, there is no need to introduce a distribution on the set of types. Relevant features of equilibrium distributions are studied by means of fixed point, nonlinear complementarity...

The Give and Take game: Analysis of a resource sharing game

Pedro Mariano, Luís Correia (2015)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We analyse Give and Take, a multi-stage resource sharing game to be played between two players. The payoff is dependent on the possession of an indivisible and durable resource, and in each stage players may either do nothing or, depending on their roles, give the resource or take it. Despite these simple rules, we show that this game has interesting complex dynamics. Unique to Give and Take is the existence of multiple Pareto optimal profiles that can also be Nash equilibria, and a...

Modeling shortest path games with Petri nets: a Lyapunov based theory

Julio Clempner (2006)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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In this paper we introduce a new modeling paradigm for shortest path games representation with Petri nets. Whereas previous works have restricted attention to tracking the net using Bellman's equation as a utility function, this work uses a Lyapunov-like function. In this sense, we change the traditional cost function by a trajectory-tracking function which is also an optimal cost-to-target function. This makes a significant difference in the conceptualization of the problem domain,...

Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games

Julio B. Clempner, Alexander S. Poznyak (2011)

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We introduce the concept of a Lyapunov game as a subclass of strictly dominated games and potential games. The advantage of this approach is that every ergodic system (repeated game) can be represented by a Lyapunov-like function. A direct acyclic graph is associated with a game. The graph structure represents the dependencies existing between the strategy profiles. By definition, a Lyapunov-like function monotonically decreases and converges to a single Lyapunov equilibrium point identified...

Large games with only small players and strategy sets in Euclidean spaces

Andrzej Wieczorek (2005)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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The games of type considered in the present paper (LSE-games) extend the concept of LSF-games studied by Wieczorek in [2004], both types of games being related to games with a continuum of players. LSE-games can be seen as anonymous games with finitely many types of players, their action sets included in Euclidean spaces and payoffs depending on a player's own action and finitely many integral characteristics of distributions of the players' (of all types) actions. We prove the existence...

Approximations of dynamic Nash games with general state and action spaces and ergodic costs for the players

Tomasz Bielecki (1997)

Applicationes Mathematicae

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The purpose of this paper is to prove existence of an ε -equilib- rium point in a dynamic Nash game with Borel state space and long-run time average cost criteria for the players. The idea of the proof is first to convert the initial game with ergodic costs to an ``equivalent" game endowed with discounted costs for some appropriately chosen value of the discount factor, and then to approximate the discounted Nash game obtained in the first step with a countable state space game for which...

Parrondo's paradox.

Berresford, Geoffrey C., Rockett, Andrew M. (2003)

International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences

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