Power analysis of voting by count and account

Midori Hirokawa; Milan Vlach

Kybernetika (2006)

  • Volume: 42, Issue: 4, page 483-493
  • ISSN: 0023-5954

Abstract

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Using players’ Shapley–Shubik power indices, Peleg [4] proved that voting by count and account is more egalitarian than voting by account. In this paper, we show that a stronger shift in power takes place when the voting power of players is measured by their Shapley–Shubik indices. Moreover, we prove that analogous power shifts also occur with respect to the absolute Banzhaf and the absolute Johnston power indices.

How to cite

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Hirokawa, Midori, and Vlach, Milan. "Power analysis of voting by count and account." Kybernetika 42.4 (2006): 483-493. <http://eudml.org/doc/33820>.

@article{Hirokawa2006,
abstract = {Using players’ Shapley–Shubik power indices, Peleg [4] proved that voting by count and account is more egalitarian than voting by account. In this paper, we show that a stronger shift in power takes place when the voting power of players is measured by their Shapley–Shubik indices. Moreover, we prove that analogous power shifts also occur with respect to the absolute Banzhaf and the absolute Johnston power indices.},
author = {Hirokawa, Midori, Vlach, Milan},
journal = {Kybernetika},
keywords = {cooperative games; voting; power indices; cooperative games; voting; power indices},
language = {eng},
number = {4},
pages = {483-493},
publisher = {Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR},
title = {Power analysis of voting by count and account},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/33820},
volume = {42},
year = {2006},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Hirokawa, Midori
AU - Vlach, Milan
TI - Power analysis of voting by count and account
JO - Kybernetika
PY - 2006
PB - Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR
VL - 42
IS - 4
SP - 483
EP - 493
AB - Using players’ Shapley–Shubik power indices, Peleg [4] proved that voting by count and account is more egalitarian than voting by account. In this paper, we show that a stronger shift in power takes place when the voting power of players is measured by their Shapley–Shubik indices. Moreover, we prove that analogous power shifts also occur with respect to the absolute Banzhaf and the absolute Johnston power indices.
LA - eng
KW - cooperative games; voting; power indices; cooperative games; voting; power indices
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/33820
ER -

References

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  1. Brams S. J., Lucas W. F., (eds.) P. D. Straffin, Political and Related Models, Springer–Verlag, New York 1983 Zbl0503.00012MR0682776
  2. Hirokawa M., Xu P., Small Creditors’ Power in Civil Rehabilitation – A Compound Game of a Simple Majority and a Weighted Majority, Mimeo, Hosei University, 2005 
  3. Lucas W. J., Measuring power in weighted voting, In: Political and Related Models (S. J. Brams, W. F. Lucas, and P. D. Straffin, eds.), Springer–Verlag, New York 1983, pp. 183–238 (1983) Zbl0514.90096
  4. Peleg B., Voting by count and account, In: Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi (R. Selten, ed.), Springer–Verlag, New York 1992, pp. 41–51 (1992) Zbl0856.90029
  5. Taylor A. D., Zwicker W. S., Simple Games, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J. 1999 Zbl0943.91005MR1714706

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