A simple proof of Suzumura's extension theorem for finite domains with applications.
A stochastic model of choice.
An approach to choice function theory is suggested which is probabilistic and non-deterministic. In the framework of this approach fuzzy choice functions are introduced and a number of necessary and sufficient conditions for a fuzzy choice function to be a fuzzy rational choice function of a certain type are established.
A tight quantitative version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem
The well-known Impossibility Theorem of Arrow asserts that any generalized social welfare function (GSWF) with at least three alternatives, which satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity and is not a dictatorship, is necessarily non-transitive. In 2002, Kalai asked whether one can obtain the following quantitative version of the theorem: For any , there exists such that if a GSWF on three alternatives satisfies the IIA condition and its probability of non-transitive...
Borda efficiency of constant scoring rules with large electorates
Caractérisation des matrices des préférences nettes et méthodes d'agrégation associées
Caractérisations axiomatiques de la distance de la différence symétrique entre des relations binaires
Computations in choice groupoids.
Condorcet et les élections. Avant-propos
Conjoint analysis: an application in eliciting patient's preferences.
Design of a Participatory Decision Making Agent Architecture Based on Argumentation and Influence Function – Application to a Serious Game about Biodiversity Conservation
This paper addresses an ongoing experience in the design of an artificial agent taking decisions and combining them with the decisions taken by human agents. The context is a serious game research project, aimed at computer-based support for participatory management of protected areas (and more specifically national parks) in order to promote biodiversity conservation and social inclusion. Its objective is to help various stakeholders (e.g., environmentalist, tourism operator) to collectively understand...
Further results on neutral consensus functions
We use a set theoretic approach to consensus by viewing an object as a set of smaller pieces called “bricks”. A consensus function is neutral if there exists a family D of sets such that a brick s is in the output of a profile if and only if the set of positions with objects that contain s belongs to D. We give sufficient set theoretic conditions for D to be a lattice filter and, in the case of a finite lattice, these conditions turn out to be necessary. Ourfinal result, which involves a finite...
Imprecise notions in individual and group decision theory: Resolutions of Allais paradox and related problems.
This paper deals with two ways in which uncertainty notions enter social science models: 1) They can be used in an effort to make intelligible some phenomena that would otherwise be difficult to comprehend, or 2) They can be use to generalize or modify the domain of validity of some theoretical results.
Impulsivity in binary choices and the emergence of periodicity.
Introduction to Formal Preference Spaces
In the article the formal characterization of preference spaces [1] is given. As the preference relation is one of the very basic notions of mathematical economics [9], it prepares some ground for a more thorough formalization of consumer theory (although some work has already been done - see [17]). There was an attempt to formalize similar results in Mizar, but this work seems still unfinished [18]. There are many approaches to preferences in literature. We modelled them in a rather illustrative...
Invariantes topológicos en el ADN, los Fullerenos y la Teoría de Elección Social.
Le vote par consensus
Médianes, Condorcet et Kendall
Medias generalizadas y aplicaciones.
More on the tournament equilibrium set
Schwartz (1990) proposed a new solution concept for choosing from a tournament ; called the Tournament Equilibrium Set. He stated four problems concerning this solution. In this paper we introduce further questions and demonstrate some logical relationship between these questions.
Note sur le calcul de la probabilité des paradoxes du vote
De nombreux travaux se sont efforcés au cours des années récentes de calculer la probabilité des paradoxes ou des difficultés que la théorie des choix collectifs a mis en évidence. On passe en revue dans cette note les principaux modèles de calcul utilisés dans ces travaux. On applique en outre l'un des modèles présentés au calcul de la probabilité de quelques paradoxes bien connus de la théorie du vote.