A value based on marginal contributions for multi–alternative games with restricted coalitions
Satoshi Masuya; Masahiro Inuiguchi
Kybernetika (2010)
- Volume: 46, Issue: 1, page 50-67
- ISSN: 0023-5954
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topMasuya, Satoshi, and Inuiguchi, Masahiro. "A value based on marginal contributions for multi–alternative games with restricted coalitions." Kybernetika 46.1 (2010): 50-67. <http://eudml.org/doc/37709>.
@article{Masuya2010,
abstract = {This paper deals with cooperative games with $n$ players and $r$ alternatives which are called multi-alternative games. In the conventional multi-alternative games initiated by Bolger, each player can choose any alternative with equal possibilities. In actual social life, there exist situations in which players have some restrictions on their choice of alternatives. Considering such situations, we study restricted multi-alternative games. A value for a given game is proposed.},
author = {Masuya, Satoshi, Inuiguchi, Masahiro},
journal = {Kybernetika},
keywords = {game theory; cooperative game; multi-alternative game; restricted game; Banzhaf value; game theory; cooperative game; multi-alternative game; restricted game; Banzhaf value},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {50-67},
publisher = {Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR},
title = {A value based on marginal contributions for multi–alternative games with restricted coalitions},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/37709},
volume = {46},
year = {2010},
}
TY - JOUR
AU - Masuya, Satoshi
AU - Inuiguchi, Masahiro
TI - A value based on marginal contributions for multi–alternative games with restricted coalitions
JO - Kybernetika
PY - 2010
PB - Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR
VL - 46
IS - 1
SP - 50
EP - 67
AB - This paper deals with cooperative games with $n$ players and $r$ alternatives which are called multi-alternative games. In the conventional multi-alternative games initiated by Bolger, each player can choose any alternative with equal possibilities. In actual social life, there exist situations in which players have some restrictions on their choice of alternatives. Considering such situations, we study restricted multi-alternative games. A value for a given game is proposed.
LA - eng
KW - game theory; cooperative game; multi-alternative game; restricted game; Banzhaf value; game theory; cooperative game; multi-alternative game; restricted game; Banzhaf value
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/37709
ER -
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