# Quasi-Bayesian behaviour: a more realistic approach to decision making?

Francisco Javier Girón; Sixto Ríos

Trabajos de Estadística e Investigación Operativa (1980)

- Volume: 31, Issue: 1, page 17-38
- ISSN: 0041-0241

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topGirón, Francisco Javier, and Ríos, Sixto. "Quasi-Bayesian behaviour: a more realistic approach to decision making?." Trabajos de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 31.1 (1980): 17-38. <http://eudml.org/doc/40809>.

@article{Girón1980,

abstract = {In this paper the theoretical and practical implications of dropping -from the basic Bayesian coherence principles- the assumption of comparability of every pair of acts is examined. The resulting theory is shown to be still perfectly coherent and has Bayesian theory as a particular case. In particular we question the need of weakening or ruling out some of the axioms that constitute the coherence principles; what are their practical implications; how this drive to the notion of partial information or partial uncertainty in a certain sense; how this partial information is combined with sample information and how this relates to Bayesian methods. We also point out the relation of this approach to rational behaviour with the more (and apparently unrelated) general notion of domination structures as applied to multicriteria decision making.},

author = {Girón, Francisco Javier, Ríos, Sixto},

journal = {Trabajos de Estadística e Investigación Operativa},

keywords = {Inferencia bayesiana; Decisión estadística; Teoría de la decisión; coherence principles; axioms of rationality; partial uncertainty; Bayesian preorders; partially ordered probabilities; domination structures},

language = {eng},

number = {1},

pages = {17-38},

title = {Quasi-Bayesian behaviour: a more realistic approach to decision making?},

url = {http://eudml.org/doc/40809},

volume = {31},

year = {1980},

}

TY - JOUR

AU - Girón, Francisco Javier

AU - Ríos, Sixto

TI - Quasi-Bayesian behaviour: a more realistic approach to decision making?

JO - Trabajos de Estadística e Investigación Operativa

PY - 1980

VL - 31

IS - 1

SP - 17

EP - 38

AB - In this paper the theoretical and practical implications of dropping -from the basic Bayesian coherence principles- the assumption of comparability of every pair of acts is examined. The resulting theory is shown to be still perfectly coherent and has Bayesian theory as a particular case. In particular we question the need of weakening or ruling out some of the axioms that constitute the coherence principles; what are their practical implications; how this drive to the notion of partial information or partial uncertainty in a certain sense; how this partial information is combined with sample information and how this relates to Bayesian methods. We also point out the relation of this approach to rational behaviour with the more (and apparently unrelated) general notion of domination structures as applied to multicriteria decision making.

LA - eng

KW - Inferencia bayesiana; Decisión estadística; Teoría de la decisión; coherence principles; axioms of rationality; partial uncertainty; Bayesian preorders; partially ordered probabilities; domination structures

UR - http://eudml.org/doc/40809

ER -