Quasi-Bayesian behaviour: a more realistic approach to decision making?

Girón, Francisco Javier, and Ríos, Sixto. "Quasi-Bayesian behaviour: a more realistic approach to decision making?." Trabajos de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 31.1 (1980): 17-38. <http://eudml.org/doc/40809>.

@article{Girón1980,
abstract = {In this paper the theoretical and practical implications of dropping -from the basic Bayesian coherence principles- the assumption of comparability of every pair of acts is examined. The resulting theory is shown to be still perfectly coherent and has Bayesian theory as a particular case. In particular we question the need of weakening or ruling out some of the axioms that constitute the coherence principles; what are their practical implications; how this drive to the notion of partial information or partial uncertainty in a certain sense; how this partial information is combined with sample information and how this relates to Bayesian methods. We also point out the relation of this approach to rational behaviour with the more (and apparently unrelated) general notion of domination structures as applied to multicriteria decision making.},
author = {Girón, Francisco Javier, Ríos, Sixto},
journal = {Trabajos de Estadística e Investigación Operativa},
keywords = {Inferencia bayesiana; Decisión estadística; Teoría de la decisión; coherence principles; axioms of rationality; partial uncertainty; Bayesian preorders; partially ordered probabilities; domination structures},
language = {eng},
number = {1},
pages = {17-38},
title = {Quasi-Bayesian behaviour: a more realistic approach to decision making?},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/40809},
volume = {31},
year = {1980},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Girón, Francisco Javier
AU - Ríos, Sixto
TI - Quasi-Bayesian behaviour: a more realistic approach to decision making?
JO - Trabajos de Estadística e Investigación Operativa
PY - 1980
VL - 31
IS - 1
SP - 17
EP - 38
AB - In this paper the theoretical and practical implications of dropping -from the basic Bayesian coherence principles- the assumption of comparability of every pair of acts is examined. The resulting theory is shown to be still perfectly coherent and has Bayesian theory as a particular case. In particular we question the need of weakening or ruling out some of the axioms that constitute the coherence principles; what are their practical implications; how this drive to the notion of partial information or partial uncertainty in a certain sense; how this partial information is combined with sample information and how this relates to Bayesian methods. We also point out the relation of this approach to rational behaviour with the more (and apparently unrelated) general notion of domination structures as applied to multicriteria decision making.
LA - eng
KW - Inferencia bayesiana; Decisión estadística; Teoría de la decisión; coherence principles; axioms of rationality; partial uncertainty; Bayesian preorders; partially ordered probabilities; domination structures
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/40809
ER -