Condorcet's theory of voting

H. P. Young

Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines (1990)

  • Volume: 111, page 45-59
  • ISSN: 0987-6936

Abstract

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Condorcet believed that the purpose of voting is to make a choice that is “best” for society. According to his view, there is one choice that is objectively best, another that is second-best, and so forth. Unfortunately, voters sometimes make mistakes ; they misperceive what is best. In designing a voting rule, therefore, the objective should be to choose the alternative that is most likely to be best. Condorcet solved this problem using a form of maximum likelihood estimation. The procedure that he derives can also be justified from a modern axiomatic perspective. It is the unique social welfare function that satisfies a variant of independant of irrelevant alternatives together with several other standard properties.

How to cite

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Young, H. P.. "Condorcet's theory of voting." Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines 111 (1990): 45-59. <http://eudml.org/doc/94396>.

@article{Young1990,
abstract = {Condorcet believed that the purpose of voting is to make a choice that is “best” for society. According to his view, there is one choice that is objectively best, another that is second-best, and so forth. Unfortunately, voters sometimes make mistakes ; they misperceive what is best. In designing a voting rule, therefore, the objective should be to choose the alternative that is most likely to be best. Condorcet solved this problem using a form of maximum likelihood estimation. The procedure that he derives can also be justified from a modern axiomatic perspective. It is the unique social welfare function that satisfies a variant of independant of irrelevant alternatives together with several other standard properties.},
author = {Young, H. P.},
journal = {Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines},
keywords = {decision},
language = {eng},
pages = {45-59},
publisher = {Ecole des hautes-études en sciences sociales},
title = {Condorcet's theory of voting},
url = {http://eudml.org/doc/94396},
volume = {111},
year = {1990},
}

TY - JOUR
AU - Young, H. P.
TI - Condorcet's theory of voting
JO - Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines
PY - 1990
PB - Ecole des hautes-études en sciences sociales
VL - 111
SP - 45
EP - 59
AB - Condorcet believed that the purpose of voting is to make a choice that is “best” for society. According to his view, there is one choice that is objectively best, another that is second-best, and so forth. Unfortunately, voters sometimes make mistakes ; they misperceive what is best. In designing a voting rule, therefore, the objective should be to choose the alternative that is most likely to be best. Condorcet solved this problem using a form of maximum likelihood estimation. The procedure that he derives can also be justified from a modern axiomatic perspective. It is the unique social welfare function that satisfies a variant of independant of irrelevant alternatives together with several other standard properties.
LA - eng
KW - decision
UR - http://eudml.org/doc/94396
ER -

References

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